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APPLYING DATA MINING ALGORITHMS ON OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE TO
COMBAT CYBER CRIME

by

XUCAN CHEN

Under the Direction of Yubao Wu, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, we investigate the applications of data mining algorithms on online
criminal information. Ever since the entry of the information era, the development of the
world wide web makes the convenience of peoples’ lives to the next level. However, at the
same time, the web is utilized by criminals for illegal activities like drug smuggling and online
fraudulence. Cryptomarkets and instant message software are the most popular two online
platforms for criminal activities. Here, we try to extract useful information from related
open source intelligence in these two platforms with data mining algorithms.
Cryptomarkets (or darknet markets) are commercial hidden-service websites that operate on The Onion Router (Tor) anonymity network, which have grown rapidly in recent years.
In this dissertation, we discover interesting characteristics of Bitcoin transaction patterns in
cryptomarkets. We present a method to identify vendors’ Bitcoin addresses by matching vendors’ feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions in the public ledger. We further propose

a cost-effective algorithm to accelerate both steps effectively. Comprehensive experimental
results have demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method.
Instant message(IM) software is another base for these criminal activities. Users of
IM applications can easily hide their identities while interacting with strangers online. In
this dissertation, we propose an effective model to discover hidden networks of influence
between members in a group chat. By transferring the whole chat history to sequential
events, we can model message sequences to a multi-dimensional Hawkes process and learn the
Granger Causality between different individuals. We learn the influence graph by applying
an expectation–maximization(EM) algorithm on our text biased multi-dimensional Hawkes
Process. Users in IM software normally maintain multiple accounts. We propose a model to
cluster the accounts that belong to the same user.
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Causality, Representation Learning
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION

Illegal online sales have grown exponentially [1]. Vendors can sell illicit products through
cryptomarkets or encrypted IM messages software like telegram easily. In darknet, the
privacy of participants in illicit online transactions is protected through both Tor and cryptocurrency. The darknet utilizes The Onion Router (Tor) network to hide users’ IP addresses
from the internet service provider. Darknet markets choose cryptocurrencies as payment currency mainly because they are anonymous. Unlike traditional currencies, cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin are decentralized[2]: there is no central authority responsible for the issuance of
cryptocurrencies and there is no need to involve a trusted third-party like banks when making
online transfers [3, 4]. Both buyers and vendors can trade anonymously through cryptocurrencies [5]. For IM software like telegram, they provide encryption services for users. Users of
IM applications can easily hide their identities while interacting with strangers online. The
privacy provided by darknet and IM software make it hard for law enforcement to trace illicit
business online. This fact inspires us to conduct the research to extract useful information
from public data in these platforms through data mining algorithms to combat cyber crime.
We first investigate the characteristics of Bitcoin transactions behind cryptomarkets
in part 2. Darknet utilized the decentralized cryptocurrencies as payment currency. We
conduct transactions on different types of markets to discover the currency management
of cryptomarkets. In part 3, we further propose a method to identify vendors’ Bitcoin
addresses by matching vendors’ feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions in the public
ledger. Each feedback review is matched to a Bitcoin transaction based on timestamp and
value transferred in this transaction. Therefore a Bitcoin address whose history transactions
can match more reviews of a vendor have a higher possibility to belong to this vendor. In
part 4, we propose a model to discover hidden influence networks between members in a
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group chat. We can model message sequences to a Temporal-Textual Multi-Dimensional
Hawkes process and learn the Granger Causality between different individuals. In part 5, we
propose a model to cluster the accounts that belong to the same user in IM software. We
design a 24-7 CNN to learn the representations of timestamp lists. By leveraging the post
and time pattern of accounts, we propose a method to learn the embedding of each account
and train a binary classifier to identify accounts from the same user.

1.1

Background
In this chapter, we provide the background information of our topic, including Darknet,

Bitcoin, and Hawkes Process respectively.
1.1.1 Darknet
A darknet market is a commercial website on the dark web that operates via darknets
such as Tor. They function primarily as black markets, selling or brokering transactions
involving drugs, weapons, counterfeit currency, stolen credit card details, forged documents,
unlicensed pharmaceuticals, steroids and other illicit goods as well as the sale of legal products. Tor is a network of virtual tunnels that allows you to improve your privacy and security
on the Internet. Tor works by sending your traffic through three random relays in the Tor
network. The last relay in the circuit (the “exit relay”) then sends the traffic out onto the
public Internet. Tor provides hidden services (also known as onion services) for users to hide
their locations and identities while offering web publishing services. Vendors and buyers
can surf the darknet through Tor browser without leakage of their IP addresses to internet
service providers.
1.1.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the first decentralized cryptocurrency (also known as digital currency or electronic cash) that operates on the peer-to-peer network without the need for intermediaries
and there are no central banks or administrators. Transactions are verified by network nodes
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via cryptography and recorded in a public distributed ledger called a blockchain. Users can
transfer Bitcoin pseudonymously because funds are not tied to real-world entities but rather
bitcoin addresses. Owners of bitcoin addresses are not explicitly identified. We focus on
Bitcoin in this dissertation because Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency which is
accepted by all darknet markets [6]. Using blockchain and distributed ledger technology,
the Bitcoin system promises great transparency and improved trust across transaction value
chains [7, 8]. Without a third-party to ensure a transaction, the Bitcoin system publishes all
of its history transaction data. The Bitcoin ledger stores all transaction records in history
which are public to any Bitcoin users. A user wallet can own multiple bitcoin addresses,
which are the “pseudonymous identity” of this user in the public ledger.
1.1.3 Hawkes Process
One-dimensional Hawkes process is a type of temporal point process which can model
the self-exciting event sequence. The intuition behind it is that previous events may trigger
the occurrence of future events. A temporal point process can be represented as a counting
process, N = {N (t)|t ∈ [0, T ]}, where N (t) records the number of events before time t.
Intensity function λ(t) = E[(dN (t)|H)]/dt represents the expected instantaneous happening
rate of event given the event history H. Due to self-excitation, the intensity function of
Hawkes process is conditionally based on history events. Given a sequence of n events on
time T = {t1 , t2 , t3 ...tn }, officially the intensity function of event in Hawkes process is

λ(t) = µ +

X

α · g(t − tj )

(1.1)

j:tj <t

where µ is exogenous base intensity independent of history while the second part on the right
side is impact from previous events. tj is the occurrence time of a previous event. g(∆t) is
the triggering kernel which decays with time difference. The earlier the previous event, the
less impact it has on the current event. α is a coefficient measuring the amount of influence
from previous events on the current event. Here we use an exponentially decaying function
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to capture the influence.
g(ti − tj ) = βe−β(ti −tj )
1.2

(1.2)

Characteristics of Bitcoin Transactions on Cryptomarkets
The darknet is a portion of the Internet that purposefully protects the identities and

privacy of both web servers and clients. The Onion Router (Tor) is the most popular instance
of a darknet and also the most popular anonymous network. A cryptomarket (or darknet
market) is a commercial website operating on the darknet. Specifically, in Tor, a cryptomarket is a hidden service website with a “.onion” link address. Most products being sold in
cryptomarkets are illicit. Some examples of popular products in cryptomarkets are drugs,
malware, and stolen credit cards. After the demise of the first cryptomarket called Silk Road
in 2013, new cryptomarkets have proliferated. Bitcoin is accepted in all cryptomarkets. As
the first decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin operates on the peer-to-peer network without
the need for intermediaries and there are no central banks or administrators. In this section,
we systematically study the vulnerabilities of Bitcoin privacy that exist in cryptomarkets.
We identify and categorize patterns of Bitcoin transactions in cryptomarkets. The observations are then used for discussing the possibility of re-identifying Bitcoin addresses related to
cryptomarkets. The conclusions obtained from this chapter can help design better Bitcoin
payment systems and strengthen the privacy protection. On the other hand, the conclusions
can also be used by law enforcement to understand the activities in cryptomarkets.
1.3

Identifying Darknet Vendor Wallets by Matching Feedback Reviews with
Bitcoin Transactions
In part 3, we aim at finding vendors’ Bitcoin addresses used in the darknet markets

by matching feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions. To narrow down the scope of the
problem, we choose Bitcoin and Wall Street Market as a study example. Each feedback
review is matched to a Bitcoin transaction based on timestamp and value transferred in
this transaction. Specifically, we decompose our problem formulation into two sub-problems:
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Bounding Box Matching Problem and Maximum Review Coverage Problem. In the Bounding
Box Matching Problem, we construct a bounding box for each review and find matched
Bitcoin transactions. We build a K-D tree from massive Bitcoin transaction data to achieve
quick range searching in a bounding box. In the Maximum Review Coverage Problem, we
prove the NP-Hardness of the problem. We exploit the submodular property of the objective
function and design a greedy algorithm with an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/e) to find a
set of addresses that can cover near-optimal product reviews received by one vendor. Our
method can discover the number of addresses used by one vendor, realizing one-to-many
mapping. We further develop an algorithm that can effectively accelerate the matching and
greedy algorithm.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose the problem of identifying the vendors’ Bitcoin addresses by matching public Bitcoin transactions to vendor’s feedback reviews in darknet markets. This problem
is important because of two potential applications. First, it helps law enforcement to
trace illicit transactions. Second, it reveals a privacy concern of cryptocurrencies so
helps better design new cryptocurrencies.
• We decompose the complicated problem into two sub-problems and provide efficient
computing algorithms for the sub-problems. We further propose a Cost-Effective Addresses Searching(CEAS) algorithm to accelerate the whole process, which can reduce
about 60% matching calculations in experiments.
• We extensively evaluate our methods in both real and synthetic data and demonstrate
the effectiveness and accuracy of our method.

1.4

Learning Infectivity Graph in Chat Group via Temporal Textual Multidimensional Hawkes Process
Instant message(IM) applications provide a convenient way for people to communicate

and exchange confidential information. Users of IM applications can easily hide their iden-
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tities while interacting with strangers online. To protect user’s privacy, some IM developers
provide encryption services for their customers. However, these privacy-protecting and convenient software has been utilized by criminals for illegal activities like drug smuggling, online
fraudulence or even anti-social activities[9].
In part 4, we propose a framework which extracts the weighted directed infectivity graph
by applying data mining and natural language processing techniques on the chat log of a
group. The chat history is a sequence of messages where each message contains information
including time when the message is posted, members who post the message and text content.
The timestamp of each message makes chat history a time series data, which can be viewed
as event sequences containing multiple event types and modeled via multi-dimensional point
processes. Each posted message can be viewed as an event with a timestamp and the person’s
identity can represent the corresponding event type. To construct Granger Causality graph
over event types(members in group), we model the data with a special class of point processes
called Hawkes processes. Hawkes Process is a type of temporal point process which is widely
used to model the self-exciting event sequences like earthquakes. When there are multiple
event types, Hawkes Process is capable of describing mutually-triggering patterns among
different event types. We relate influence between users to the possibility of replies among
members. Natural language processing techniques are utilized to find dialogues in group
chat logs. Impact functions of Hawkes process can capture the influence graph.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose the problem of detecting the influence graph from group chat. It helps
law enforcement to analyze the organizational structure and key person from criminal
activities in group chat.
• We present a modeling framework based on text biased Marked Multi-dimensional
Hawkes Process. Hawkes Process can extract mutual-triggering patterns over individuals in a group. We further apply natural language processing techniques to identity
conversations from the chat log and update impact functions of Hawkes process with
the reply embedding. By applying an EM algorithm on the model, we are able to learn
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the influence graph over individuals from chat logs.
.

1.5

Clustering of Accounts in Online Messaging Software through Attributed
Heterogeneous Information Networks
In this work, we propose a model to learn the representations of each account in group

chat through attributed heterogeneous information networks.
The aim of this work is to cluster users based on time pattern and text of the post. The
intuition behind our method is that if a vendor has several accounts, he or she will post the
similar content with a similar time pattern by using these accounts.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We present a model to learn the representations of time stamp series by training a
CNN auto-encoder. The embedding we learned can be used to measure the similarity
of two timestamp lists effectively.
• We build an Attributed Heterogeneous Information Network. In the AHIN we built,
it contains four types of nodes: User, account, post and product. We train a model
to learn the embedding of each node. To effectively measure the relationship between
nodes in constructed AHIN, we sample paths from AHIN through weighted random
walk and propose a new network embedding model User2Vector to learn the hidden
representations of each user. We further train a binary classifier to classify two user
representations we learned by User2Vector.
• We extensively evaluate our methods in both real and synthetic data and demonstrate
the accuracy of our method.
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1.6

Proposed Dissertation Organization
In this dissertation proposal, we plan to investigate how to efficiently extract useful in-

formation from darknet and IM software. In part 2, we describe our experiments of purchases
in cryptomarkets and summarize the Bitcoin transaction mechanisms behind cryptomarkets.
In part 3, we present a greedy method to identify vendors’ bitcoin addresses by matching
vendors’ feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions in the public ledger. In part 4, we
present our work which models group chat with Hawkes Process to discover hidden networks
of influence between members. In part 5, we propose a model to cluster the accounts from
the same user by learning the embedding of these accounts. In part 6, we conclude this
dissertation.
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PART 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS ON
CRYPTOMARKETS

In this chapter, we discover interesting characteristics of Bitcoin transaction patterns
in cryptomarkets. The results demonstrate that the privacy protection mechanism in cryptomarkets and Bitcoin is vulnerable.

2.1

Motivation
Illegal online sales have grown exponentially [1]. The privacy of participants in illicit

online transactions in darknet is protected through both Tor and cryptocurrency. Vendors
in cryptomarket sell illicit products like drugs, malware, and stolen credit cards. The sales
on the darknet market hit a new high in 2021 although the law enforcement has spent a lot
of resources to fight these illegal transactions.
Table (2.1) Cryptomarkets and Accepted Cryptocurrencies
Cryptomarkets
Dream
Berlusconi
Wall Street
Empire
Point Tochka
Silk Road 3.1

#Ads
166, 216
38, 462
16, 847
9, 538
6, 468
5, 738

Bitcoin
X
X
X
X
X
X

Monero

X
X
X

Litecoin Ethereum

Bitcoin Cash
X

X
X

X
X

X

From Table 2.1, we can see that Bitcoin is accepted in all cryptomarkets. In addition
to Bitcoin, four other types of cryptocurrencies are also accepted by different markets. They
are monero, litecoin, ethereum, and Bitcoin cash. Note that Bitcoin cash is a variant of but
different from Bitcoin and is an independent currency. Bitcoin cash is generally considered
to be faster in the transaction confirmation process but less secure than Bitcoin. In our
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study, we focus on Bitcoin since it is the most popular cryptocurrency and widely accepted
by all markets. The observed Bitcoin transaction patterns in this chapter provide insights
for analyzing other types of cryptocurrencies.
Since all Bitcoin transactions are public, it is hard to fully protect the privacy of Bitcoin
users. The news has revealed that adversaries could spy on a careless company by first paying
it in Bitcoins and then tracking how that money flows [10–12]. To better protect the privacy,
Bitcoin users have extensively used mixing services to obscure the Bitcoin trails [10].

Figure (2.1) The Feedback in the Dream Market

In cryptomarkets, adversaries could place orders and then track money flows. Cryptomarkets display the buyers’ feedback in order to demonstrate the vendors’ reputation.
Figure 2.1 shows the screenshot of the feedback page in the Dream Market. From Figure
2.1, we can see the post time, rating star, text comment, masked buyer ID, and approximate amount of money. Each rating actually represents a Bitcoin transaction. Even though
we can only observe approximate time and money in ratings, the accumulation of a lot of
such approximate transaction records could potentially allow adversaries to reveal relevant
Bitcoin addresses. Figure 2.2 shows the screenshot of the feedback page in the Wall Street
Market. From Figure 2.2, we can observe similar ratings. All markets in Table 2.1 display
feedback publicly. This potentially allows adversaries to re-identify the Bitcoin addresses of
buyers, vendors, and escrow accounts in cryptomarkets, thus increasing the vulnerability of
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Figure (2.2) The Feedback in the Wall Street Market

the privacy protection in Bitcoin.

2.2

Related Work
Ron et al. is the first to build a Bitcoin graph and analyze the quantitative attributes in

Bitcoin transaction history [13]. Clustering Bitcoin addresses into wallets is one basic task in
the Bitcoin transaction analysis. Researchers have widely used two simple heuristics [14–16].
The first heuristic is to put shadow or change address together with its input address into one
wallet. The second heuristics is to put all input addresses into one wallet if there is a single
output address. Androulaki et al. test the effectiveness of the Bitcoin address clustering
methods with stimulations [14]. Spagnuolo et al. link the clustered wallets to the Silk Road
escrow addresses exposed by FBI and analyze the Bitcoin flow [15]. Fleder et al. not only
link the clustered wallets with Silk Road escrow but also link wallets with public wallets [16].
PageRank is then applied on the transaction graph to find interesting and important wallets
[16]. The effectiveness of address clustering is also studied [17]. Mixing technology is also
introduced to improve the anonymity [18, 19].
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2.3

Escrow Services in Cryptomarkets
In this section, we review the escrow services in cryptomarkets. All cryptomarkets

provide escrow services to avoid scams and protect both buyers and vendors.

Figure (2.3) A Flowchart Depicting a Transaction in Cryptomarkets

Figure 2.3 shows the typical process of one transaction [20]. The buyer places an order
and pays with Bitcoins after browsing the products within the Tor web browser. The market
holds the Bitcoins until the buyer confirms the order. The vendor accepts and fulfills the
order. The buyer confirms the order and gives feedback reviews. The market releases the
Bitcoins to the vendor and charges a commission fee. If the buyer is not satisfied with the
product or service, the buyer disputes the order. In this case, the market decides where
the escrow Bitcoins go. The escrow Bitcoins go either back to the buyer or to the vendor
depending on the dispute result.
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2.4

Bitcoin Transactions
2.4.1 Parsing Bitcoin Transactions
To trace the Bitcoin flow, we parse the blocks in the public Bitcoin blockchain and

obtain the Bitcoin transactions. We install the Bitcoin core program [21] and run a Bitcoin
full node [22]. The Bitcoin full node automatically synchronizes with other nodes in the
Bitcoin network, and downloads all blocks in the blockchain. The blocks contain the public
ledger data and are the inputs of our parsing algorithm. A new block is generated around
every 10 minutes.
Algorithm 1 Parsing Bitcoin Transactions
Input: Blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain
Output: Bitcoin transactions (a set of .json files whose names are formatted timestamps)
for each block do
transaction time ⇐ block.timestamp;
create a new file: formatted transaction timestamp.json;
for each transaction in the block.transactions do
transaction hash ⇐ transaction.this transaction hash;
receiver list = [] ;
for each receiver in the transaction.receivers do
receiver list.add(receiver.index, receiver.Bitcoin address, receiver.Bitcoin value)
sender list = [] ;
for each sender in the transaction.senders do
sender list.add(sender.index, sender.previous transaction hash,
sender.previous transaction index)
[transaction time, transaction hash, sender list, receiver list] ⇒
formatted transaction timestamp.json

Algorithm 1 shows our parsing algorithm. We use the existing Python Bitcoin parser
to parse the blocks (raw Bitcoin data) and construct the Bitcoin transaction tree [23, 24].
In Algorithm 1, we parse the blocks one by one (lines 1-12) and save one timestamp for all
transactions in one block (line 2). For each transaction in one block, we parse the transaction
hash (line 5), the receiver list (lines 6-8), and the sender list (lines 9-11). Each transaction
contains four parts: timestamp, hash, sender list, and receiver list, and is written into a
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Algorithm 2 Constructing Bitcoin Transaction Flow Tree
Input: Bitcoin transactions (a set of .json files whose names are formatted timestamps)
Output: Bitcoin transaction flow tree G(V, E)
read the list of json files;
for each json file (process them in the chronological order) do
read all transactions in the json file;
for each transaction tx do
for each receiver in tx.receiver list do
add node r = [tx.transaction hash, receiver.index, receiver.Bitcoin address,
receiver.Bitcoin value] to the node set V ;
for each sender in tx.sender list do
find node s ∈ V with s.transaction hash = sender.previous transaction hash
and s.index = sender.index;
add an edge (s, r) to the edge set E;

json file (line 12). One receiver contains the Bitcoin address and the Bitcoin values. Each
sender in one transaction does not contain a Bitcoin address nor Bitcoin value. Instead, each
sender contains transaction hash and index pointing to an earlier transaction. We can use
that transaction hash to retrieve the earlier transaction and use the transaction index to find
the referred receiver from the receiver list. By linking the sender in the current transaction
with the receiver in the earlier transaction, we can generate a Bitcoin transaction flow tree.
Algorithm 2 shows the construction of the Bitcoin transaction flow tree. Algorithm 2
processes the json files in the chronological order. This guarantees that old transactions will
be processed earlier than new transactions. Since a receiver has a Bitcoin address, we can
directly add a node (transaction hash, Bitcoin address) to the flow tree. Since a sender does
not have a Bitcoin address, we need to look it up in an earlier transaction. Since earlier
transactions have been processed, the sender must exist in the node set V as a receiver.
Therefore, we search over all the nodes in V and compare the transaction hash and index
values (lines 8). Then we add an edge from this earlier receiver to the current receiver in the
flow tree. If there are multiple senders and receivers in a mixing transaction, these senders
and receivers will form a complete bipartite graph, i.e., there is an edge from any sender to
any receiver. We do not know who sends money to whom in a mixing transaction.
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Algorithm 3 Local Search Algorithm for Extracting a Subtree
Input: Bitcoin transaction flow tree G(V, E), query q = (q hash, q btc address), k hops
Output: Subtree G[T ]
ignore the edge direction, G.Adj[u] represents the neighbors;
for each node v ∈ V do v.d = ∞ ;
S ⇐ {q}; T ⇐ {}; q.d = 0;
while True do
extract node u with minimum u.d value among all nodes in the set S − T ;
if u.d > k then break;
T ⇐ T ∪ u; S ⇐ S ∪ G.Adj[u];
for each node x in G.Adj[u] do x.d = min{x.d, u.d + 1} ;

Figure (2.4) Shadow Address

Algorithm 3 shows a local search algorithm that retrieves a subtree containing all nodes
that are k-hop away from the query node. The query node is determined by the transaction
hash and Bitcoin address. In our experiment, we use Algorithm 3 to extract a subtree
given a query node containing our Bitcoin address. The subtree is nimble for us to analyze
interesting patterns.
Shadow Address: Bitcoin creates a new address for the sender in each transaction to
obtain better anonymity [25]. The newly generated address is called “shadow address” or
“change address” of the original address of the sender [14]. Figure 2.4 shows one Bitcoin
transaction. The sender’s original address has .09. After .05 is sent to the receiver, the
sender still has .04 in the change address.
Multiple inputs and single output: Considering the multiple addresses one user can own,
Bitcoin supports a user to send Bitcoins from multiple addresses in one transaction. Figure
2.5 shows one Bitcoin transaction containing multiple inputs and one output. The sender
sends money from four Bitcoin addresses to the receiver’s address. We assume that it is
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unlikely that two senders send money to the same address at the same time since the Bitcoin
addresses keep changing. If we observe a transaction with multiple inputs and single output,
we can assume all input addresses belong to the same sender.

Figure (2.5) Multi-Inputs

These two properties help track Bitcoin flows or cluster addresses into wallets [14, 16, 26].

Figure (2.6) A Mixing Transaction
Mixing services: are widely used as a privacy overlay on top of Bitcoin [27]. Mixing
services are also known as tumblers. The mixer will mix several transactions into one,
intending to confuse the trail linking back to the source. In a mixing transaction, the
multiple inputs are from different senders and the multiple outputs go to different receivers.
Mixing services reduce the traceability of Bitcoin flows which makes the analysis of Bitcoin
graphs more difficult. Figure 2.6 shows a mixing transaction with four senders and three
receivers. In this example, we do not know who sends money to whom because there are
multiple possible flows.
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2.4.2 Actions and Observed Resulting Transactions
In this section, we describe our experiments in cryptomarkets. All cryptomarkets offer
escrow services to avoid scams. With the escrow service, the Bitcoin is saved in escrow
accounts after a buyer places an order and is sent to the vendor until the buyer confirms
the order. Since we know the start point (buyer address) of the transaction, we can trace
Bitcoin flows to uncover escrow and vendors’ addresses.
Table (2.2) Observed Bitcoin Flow from Operations in Different Cryptomarkets
Cryptomarkets
Point Tochka
Dream
Empire
Silk Road 3.1
Wall Street
Berlusconi

Deposit
X
X
X
X

Withdraw
X
X
X
X

No such function

No such function

No such function

No such function

Order
X
No observation
No observation
No observation
X
X

Confirm
X
No observation
No observation
No observation
X
No observation

In each market, four operations are performed: deposit, withdraw, order, and confirmation. The resulting transactions may or may not be observed in the Bitcoin transaction flow.
Table 2.2 shows whether we can observe the Bitcoin transactions for the four operations
in cryptomarkets. From Table 2.2, we can see that the Dream, Empire, and SilkRoad 3.1
Market operate in a similar way. These markets require buyers to deposit Bitcoins first.
When buyers withdraw Bitcoins from the market, the market will send Bitcoins to buyers’
wallets from an address different from the deposit address. When we order or confirm a
purchase, we cannot observe any transactions in Bitcoin flow. The Point Tochka Market
also requires a deposit. When we order and confirm a purchase in the Point Tochka Market,
we can observe the transactions from buyer to escrow and then to vendor in the Bitcoin flow.
The Wall Street and Berlusconi Markets do not require deposit. In the Wall street Market,
when we order and confirm a purchase, we can also observe the corresponding transactions
in the Bitcoin flow. In the Berlusconi Market, we can observe the transactions in Bitcoin
flow when we order. The Bitcoins sent to escrow are transferred to other escrow addresses
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through a mixing service before we confirm the purchase. Therefore, we cannot observe the
transaction when we confirm the purchase.

Table (2.3) Deposit and Withdrawal in the Point Tochka Market
Action
Deposit .0024
Withdraw .0008
Deposit .0010
Withdraw .0006

Observed Bitcoin
Sender
A1: .0030
B1: .0024
A2: .0006, A2: .0008
B1: .0026

transaction
Receiver
B1: .0024, A2:
A2: .0008, B1:
B1: .0026, A3:
A3: .0006, B1:

Balance
.0006
.0016
.0004
.0020

.0024
.0016
.0026
.0020

In the next, we will study the Bitcoin transaction patterns when we interact with
the markets. We first study the deposit and withdrawal actions and then the order and
confirmation actions. In each market, four operations are performed: deposit .0024, withdraw
.0008, deposit .0010, and withdraw .0006. We monitor the Bitcoin transaction flow to see
whether we can observe any related transactions or not. To simplify the illustration, we omit
the fees charged during the deposit and withdrawal actions.
Deposit and Withdrawal in the Point Tochka Market: Table 2.3 shows the
actions we perform and the resulting Bitcoin transactions in the Point Tochka Market. In
Table 2.3, each row represents an action we perform and the resulting Bitcoin transaction.
We use letter “A” followed by an integer to represent our Bitcoin addresses and letter “B”
followed by an integer to represent the deposit Bitcoin addresses provided by the market.
For example, in the first row, we deposit .0024 and the resulting transaction is “A1:
.0030 → B1: .0024, A2: .0006”. In the sender part “A1: .0030”, A1 represents our Bitcoin
address and .0030 represents the money in that address. In the receiver part “B1: .0024,
A2: .0006”, B1 represents the deposit Bitcoin address provided by the Point Tochka Market,
.0024 represents the money that B1 receives, A2 represents our new Bitcoin address, and
.0006 represents the change in the new address A2. The last column in Table 2.3 shows the
balance in the market wallet.
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In the second row of Table 2.3, we withdraw .0008 and the resulting transaction is “B1:
.0024 → A2: .0008, B1: .0016”. B1 still represents the deposit Bitcoin address and A2
still represents our Bitcoin address for receiving the money. We further deposit .0010 and
withdraw .0006, and the resulting transactions are shown in Table 2.3.
From Table 2.3, we can see that the deposit Bitcoin address in the market does not
change. Among all cryptomarkets in Table 2.1, the Point Tochka Market has the most
transparent Bitcoin transaction flows, which can be further confirmed when we study the
order and confirmation actions.

Table (2.4) Deposit and Withdrawal in the Dream Market
Action
Deposit .0024
Withdraw .0008
Deposit .0010
Withdraw .0006

Observed Bitcoin transaction
Sender
Receiver
A1: .0030
B1: .0024, A2: .0006
B2: .0008
A2: .0008
A2: .0006, A2: .0008
B3: .0010, A3: .0004
B4: .0006
A4: .0006

Balance
.0024
.0016
.0026
.0020

Deposit and Withdrawal in the Dream Market: We perform the same sequence
of actions in the Dream Market and Table 2.4 shows the resulting transactions. From Table
2.4, we can see that the Bitcoin address B2 that sends us money during the first withdrawal is
different from the Bitcoin address B1 that receives our money during the first deposit. After
the second withdrawal, we find that there is still .0024 in B1. This means that the Dream
Market uses different Bitcoin addresses to receive deposits and send withdrawal. From the
subsequent deposit and withdrawal actions, the deposit is sent to B3 and the withdrawal is
received from B4. This further confirms the observation. This mechanism makes it harder
to track the Bitcoin flow, thus better protects the privacy of the market and prevents the
re-identification attack.
The Empire and Silk Road 3.1 Markets have similar transaction patterns as Dream
Market for the deposit and withdrawal actions. We omit the tables for them. The Wall
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Street and Berlusconi Markets provide neither deposit nor withdrawal functions. They allow
buyers to directly pay from their own Bitcoin addresses.
In the next, we study patterns in the resulting Bitcoin transactions for the order and
confirmation actions.

Table (2.5) Order and Confirmation in the Point Tochka Market
Action
Order .0014
Confirm
Order .0015
Confirm

Observed Bitcoin transaction
Sender
Receiver
B1: .0040
C1: .0014, B1: .0026
C1: .0014
D1: .0014
B1: .0026
C2: .0015, B1: .0011
C2: .0015
D2: .0015

Balance
.0026
.0026
.0011
.0011

Order and Confirmation in the Point Tochka Market: We purchase two orders
and Table 2.5 shows the resulting Bitcoin transactions. After we place the first order, the
money is sent from the deposit Bitcoin address B1 to an escrow account C1. The balance is
sent back to B1. After the vendor fulfills the order, we confirm it. The money in the escrow
C1 is then immediately transferred to a new Bitcoin address D1, which is suspected of being
the vendor’s Bitcoin address. In the second order, we pay 0.0015 to a different vendor.
Similar to the transactions in the first order, the money moves to an escrow account C2 after
the order and then moves from C2 to the destination Bitcoin address after confirmation. The
escrow address C2 is different from the old escrow address C1. From this experiment, we can
see that the Bitcoin transaction flows are transparent. For each new order, the market will
generate a new escrow Bitcoin address. We also observe that our deposit Bitcoin address will
not change. By tracking the money flowing out of the escrow accounts, we can potentially
find the suspicious Bitcoin addresses of vendors.
Order and Confirmation in the Dream Market: We also purchase two products
in the Dream Market and Table 2.6 shows the resulting transactions. After we place the
first order of 0.0014, we find that no transaction associated with the deposit Bitcoin address
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Table (2.6) Order and Confirmation in the Dream Market
Action
Order .0014
Confirm
Order .0015
Confirm

Observed Bitcoin transaction
Sender
Receiver
B1: .0040 does not change
B1: .0040 still no change. No transactions observed
B1: .0040 does not change
B1: .0040 still no change. No transactions observed

Balance
.0026
.0026
.0011
.0011

B1 happens. After the vendor fulfills the order and we confirm it, still nothing happens.
This means Dream Market uses a different escrow Bitcoin address to pay the vendor and the
money in the original deposit address B1 does not move. Since we know neither the escrow
address used to pay the vendor nor the vendor Bitcoin address, there is no easy way for us
to observe the relevant transactions. We suspect that the Dream Market has its own private
ledger to record the balances of the deposit and escrow accounts for each user. After each
order, the Bitcoin in the deposit account will be transferred to the escrow account. After
each confirmation, the Bitcoin in the escrow account will be transferred out to the vendor’s
accounts. The ledger of Dream Market might be a private and centralized ledger. This
strategy makes the transactions within the Dream Market stealthy and cannot be seen from
the public. This strategy well protects the privacy of the market and vendors.

Table (2.7) Order and Confirmation in the Wall Street Market
Action
Order .0014
Confirm
Order .0015
Confirm

Observed Bitcoin transaction
Sender
Receiver
A1: .0040
C1: .0014, A2: .0026
C1: .0014 is transferred to another address through mixing
A2: .0026
C2: .0015, A3: .0011
C2: .0015 is transferred to another address through mixing

Order and Confirmation in the Wall Street Market: The Wall Street Market does
not have a deposit function. It allows us to pay directly with our Bitcoin address. When we
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purchase, we are required to send a specific amount of Bitcoin to a newly generated escrow
address and to provide a Bitcoin address for receiving the refund if the order fails. Following
this procedure, we purchase two products. Table 2.7 shows the resulting transactions. After
we place the first order, we can see the escrow address C1. After we confirm the order, we
can observe that the money in the escrow C1 is transferred to a new Bitcoin address through
a mixing service. Since there are multiple receivers, we do not know which one is the receiver
corresponding to the escrow C1.

Table (2.8) Order and Confirmation in the Berlusconi Market
Action
Order .0014
Confirm
Order .0015
Confirm

Observed Bitcoin transaction
Sender
Receiver
A1: .0040
C1: .0014, A2: .0026
C1: .0014 is transferred to another address through mixing
A2: .0026
C2: .0015, A3: .0011
C2: .0015 is transferred to another address through mixing

Order and Confirmation in the Berlusconi Market: The Berlusconi Market does
not have a deposit function either. We directly pay with our Bitcoin address and Table 2.8
shows the resulting transactions. After we place the first order, we can see the escrow address
C1. But before we confirm the order, the money in the escrow C1 is already transferred to
a new Bitcoin address through the mixing service. This makes it hard for us to track the
Bitcoin flows. Similar pattern is observed for the second order. The Berlusconi Market
applies mixing services on escrow addresses to further protect the privacy of the market and
vendors.
Since the Wall Street and Point Tochka Markets provide more transparent Bitcoin
transaction patterns, the feedback reviews may help re-identify the Bitcoin addresses of
vendors. A feedback review is usually posted right after the buyer confirms the order. Each
review represents an approximate Bitcoin transaction including approximate date and money.
We will see more details in the next sections.
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2.5

Bitcoin Transaction Patterns
2.5.1 Dream Market
In this section, we track back the Bitcoin flows of the withdrawal operation in Dream

Market with Algorithm 3. We find a Bitcoin address containing more than 800 Bitcoins
which is worth over 3 million dollars at present, and it collects those Bitcoins from multiple
addresses in one transaction. Figure 2.7 shows part of the flow tree we observed. The red
node represents our Bitcoin address for receiving money in the withdrawal. We observe a
Bitcoin transaction pattern called “peeling chain” [26].
Peeling Chain: The head of a peeling chain is a Bitcoin address with a lot of Bitcoins.
A small amount of Bitcoin is peeled off from this address in a transaction and a ”Shadow
address” is generated to collect the remaining and still large amount of Bitcoin. By repeating
this process, the large amount of Bitcoin can be peeled down. Peeling chain is popular for
organizations dealing with a lot of clients. The Bitcoin addresses in a peeling chain are not
necessarily the addresses of Dream escrow accounts. They might be exchange addresses [28].

Figure (2.7) Bitcoin “peeling chain” Patterns in the Dream Market
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The head of this peeling chain is a Bitcoin address which receives more than 800 Bitcoins.
In each transaction, 10 Bitcoins are transferred to a new address and the remaining amount
is transferred to the shadow address. We call these blue addresses in the main chain the
first level escrow addresses. Each of the addresses containing 10 Bitcoins becomes a head
of a new smaller peeling chain. In this new chain, one transaction peels off an even smaller
amount of Bitcoin to pay different users. We call the green addresses in the smaller peeling
chains the second level escrow addresses. The Bitcoins peeled off from the second order
addresses are sent to third level escrow addresses, which are white nodes in Figure 2.7. The
white nodes directly send Bitcoins to users (red nodes) of the dream market. The amount of
Bitcoin received by the third order escrow address is exactly the number of Bitcoins required
by users. No shadow addresses are generated.
In addition to this pattern, we also notice that the mixing pattern from the third order
escrow addresses to users’ addresses. The Dream market allows users to use mixing services.
Users need to pay a certain percentage of fees to use mixing services when they withdraw
Bitcoins.
Clustering Bitcoin addresses: The peeling chain patterns can potentially help cluster
Bitcoin addresses of users in the Dream Market. Since we can track the peeling chain easily,
we may be able to identify other transactions happening in the Dream Market by comparing
the white-red transactions with the feedback reviews.
2.5.2 Wall Street Market

Table (2.9) The Bitcoin Transaction Relevant to the Order Action
Hash (txid)
25f33135c87b37205b49a9ade6faa1d6837a4fcb42340270753562b7e1802bee
Time (UTC) 2019-03-05 16:49
Input count: 1 ; Output count: 2
Input 0
15v3cQR4H9iz3nb1tXwNd33ETo7ZEX2wir
.03554909
$132.31
Output 0
33sYgQnBkBkm3mDbWJY6KMoT7no1eNd4j5
.00032256
$1.20
Output 1
14ZKcens6g6J58kBVGNk3Hs2a94NE3bnUT
.03517496
$130.92
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Figure (2.8) Feedback Ratings in the Wall Street Market
Table (2.10) The Bitcoin Transaction Relevant to the Confirmation Action
Feedback
u***y - 03/08 01:36 am - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid)
27c4946ad1e5e648e987d66a882d98f08ebcb3bae8d11aea70b9dac7219aa036
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 02:06
Input count: 24 ; Output count: 22
Input 16
33sYgQnBkBkm3mDbWJY6KMoT7no1eNd4j5
.00032256
$1.20
Output 8
39o2XAjmFTkSGFrkUPsJRNrDUvUCYiXyP5
.00061720
$2.39
Output 10
336djQeGFA4etdRv3xRESoKVV3zHr8YvMv
.00020500
$0.79
Output 18
3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV
.00029320
$1.14

In this section, we explore the possibility of linking Wall Street feedback reviews with
Bitcoin transactions. We order a product “Spotify Premium Lifetime Warranty” and pay
$1.25 on about 4:40 pm, March 5, 2019, then we confirm the order and write a review by
01:36 am, March 8, 2019. Figure 2.8 shows some feedback reviews. In Figure 2.8, the fourth
review is written by us and “u***y” is our account ID. Since we know our Bitcoin address
“15v3...”, we track the money flow.
Table 2.9 shows the transaction relevant to the order action. The output address
“33sY...” is the escrow account, and the other output address “14ZK...” is the shadow
address containing our remaining money. Table 2.10 shows the transaction relevant to the
confirmation action. It is a mixing transaction containing 24 inputs and 22 outputs. The
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Table (2.11) The Bitcoin Transactions Relevant to the Feedback Reviews in Fig. 2.8
Feedback
H***e - 03/08 10:49 pm - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid)
5542aaf1c045f951ba7623510237217d97009eb403778cec6ae101d4462583e1
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 23:07
Input count: 47 ; Output count: 42
Output 40
3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV
.00028800
$1.12
Feedback
h***5 - 03/08 06:33 am - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid)
bb6a4c9d5c747d941eeb6fc5031973351382cb0550be35bfbefda0c07380b63d
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 08:26
Input count: 15 ; Output count: 20
Output 19
3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV
.00029290
$1.13
Feedback
a***k - 03/07 06:33 pm - 10 USD
Hash (txid)
c022177c6bb26a2c3ad82b699bb9d3d950131a8b13dd54665e7f6e4f8d8263a3
Time (UTC) 2019-03-07 19:21
Input count: 35 ; Output count: 38
Output 26
3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV
.00251950
$9.75

escrow address “33sY...” is in the sender list. Table 2.10 shows top three output addresses
whose receiving Bitcoins are most close to the money we send. By comparing the Bitcoins
of the three outputs with our money $1.25, we can see that output address “3Jpp...” is most
likely to be the vendor’s address. We can also see that the transaction happens at 2019-03-08
02:06, which is 30 minutes later than our review time 01:36 am.
We further explore the transactions related to “3Jpp...”. Table 2.11 shows the list of
transactions relevant to the reviews in Figure 2.8. For example, the first transaction happens
at 2019-03-08 23:07 and the amount of money is $1.12, which matches with the feedback
review “H***e - 03/08 10:49 pm - 1.25 USD”. The time of the transaction is 18-minute later
than the time of review. Comparing the reviews in Figure 2.8 with the transactions in Table
2.10 and 2.11, we can see we successfully find the transactions of four reviews. For the first
and sixth reviews in Figure 2.8, we do not find them manually. This is because the vendor
may have multiple Bitcoin address for receiving money and “3Jpp...” might be just one of
them.
We purchase the product again and find the same Bitcoin address “3Jpp...” receiving
the money. This further confirms that “3Jpp...” belongs to the vendor.
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2.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, We find interesting Bitcoin transaction patterns associated with cryp-

tomarkets. The results demonstrate that the privacy protection mechanism in Bitcoin is still
vulnerable in terms of simple analysis. An adversary can easily gain valuable information
for analyzing the activities happening in the markets.
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PART 3

IDENTIFYING DARKNET VENDOR WALLETS BY MATCHING
FEEDBACK REVIEWS WITH BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS

In this chapter, we extend our work to present a method to identify vendors’ Bitcoin
addresses by matching vendors’ feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions in the public
ledger.

3.1

Motivation
In part 2, we describe our experiments of purchases in Wall Street market, the most

popular darknet markets before it was taken down. Since we know the start point (buyer
address) of the transaction, we can track Bitcoin flows from the start point during our
purchase.
In darknet markets, buyers do not send Bitcoin to vendors directly. All darknet markets
provide escrow services to avoid scams and protect both buyers and vendors. In each market,
two operations are performed by the buyer: order and confirm the order. Like normal online
shopping, buyers need to order products first and they can confirm this order once they
receive the product. In part 2, we show whether we can observe related Bitcoin transactions
in public ledger for these two operations in some biggest darknet markets [29]. In the Wall
Street Market, when we order a product or confirm this order, a related Bitcoin transaction
occurs .
Figure 3.1 shows the resulting Bitcoin flow during these two operations by a buyer. A
consumer needs to send Bitcoin to a newly generated escrow address after he places an order.
Bitcoin will stay in this escrow address until the buyer confirms the order when they received
the product. The confirmation will trigger the Bitcoin transfer from the escrow address to the
vendor’s address through a mixed transaction. Mixed transactions are utilized to break the
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Figure (3.1) Bitcoin Flow of One Purchase in Wall Street Market

direct connection between the sender and receiver address by combining several transactions
into one transaction with multiple senders and multiple receivers [30, 31]. However, we still
can get the amount of Bitcoin received by each receiver address in mixed transaction.
In Wall Street Market, 94.5% of Bitcoin in escrow address is sent to the vendor’s address,
and the remaining 5.5% is transferred to the Wall Street market address as a commission
fee during a mixed transaction. When the buyer confirms that they have received the illicit
product, they need to write feedback that appears in the review list of products with time and
amount of dollars spent during this transaction. Experiments we have in Wall Street Market
show the time when the review posted is close to the time when a mixed transaction happened
and the price of a product should be close to the Bitcoin value received by the vendor’s
address. Each feedback review is matched to a Bitcoin transaction based on timestamp and
value transferred in this transaction. If we could find the related Bitcoin transaction in the
public ledger, the receiver of this transaction is the Bitcoin address from the vendor.

3.2

Related Work
3.2.1

Bitcoin De-anonymization

The rise of Bitcoin has increased researchers’ interest in privacy provided in cryptocurrency [32–36], also the usage of Bitcoin in darknet [37]. To attack the privacy of Bitcoin,
the most common way is to study the Bitcoin transaction graph after clustering the Bitcoin
address from one wallet. A wallet represents an entity. A user stores all addresses in a wal-
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let. Researchers have widely clustered Bitcoin addresses heuristically. Androulaki tested the
effectiveness of the Bitcoin address clustering methods with simulation [34]. Spagnuolo links
the clustered addresses to the Silk Road escrow address exposed by the FBI and analyzes
the Bitcoin flow related to this escrow address [32]. Fleder not only linked the clustered
addresses to Silk Road escrow but also linked Bitcoin addresses to some public entities [33].
PageRank is then applied on the transaction graph to find addresses that are close to the
Silk Road escrow address. In the transaction graph, each node represents an entity that
contains all addresses owned by this entity. However, current clustering methods don’t work
for mixed transactions that combine several transactions into one transaction with multiple senders and multiple receivers. Mix is quite common in Bitcoin transactions, especially
illegal transactions in recent years. In this chapter, our method is the first one to explore
relationships between feedback of vendors and receiver parts of Bitcoin transactions which
won’t be affected by mixed transactions.
3.2.2 Matching
If we treat each review as one type of node and Bitcoin transaction as another type of
node, reviews of a vendor and transactions from an address can form a bipartite graph after
we link the review to the matched transaction. Portnoff matches specific ads to publicly
available Bitcoin transactions based on the cost of ads and timestamp at which the ad was
placed [38]. Hungarian algorithm and Hopcroft-Karp algorithm are two greedy algorithms
that can successfully find the maximum matching in bipartite graph [39–41]. We can use
these algorithms to find the maximum matching between a vendor and a Bitcoin address.
However, this method is not effective enough to match multiple addresses. A vendor in the
darknet normally owns a lot of Bitcoin addresses.
3.2.3 Submodular Function
Submodular optimization algorithm has been exploited in other areas before [42–45].
Kempe using a greedy algorithm based on submodular function to maximize the influence in
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Table (3.1) Main Symbols
symbols
b(t, u, r)
B
R
f (τ, v)
F
θ, φ
S(R)
s(R)

definitions
a Bitcoin transaction with timestamp t, money value u,
and receiving address r
a set of Bitcoin transactions, B = {bi (ti , ui , ri )}
a set of receiving Bitcoin addresses, R = {ri }
a feedback review with timestamp t and money value v
a set of feedback reviews, F = {fj (τj , vj )}, from one vendor
bounding box thresholds of timestamp and money value
a set function, input R: a set of receiving Bitcoin addresses,
output: the set of feedback reviews matched with R
a set function, input R: a set of receiving Bitcoin addresses,
output: the number of feedback reviews matched with R, i.e.,
s(R) = |S(R)|, where | · | represents the cardinality of a set

social networks [46]. Leskovec exploits the submodularity of outbreak detection to develop
an efficient approximation algorithm for water distribution and the blogosphere monitoring
problem [47].

3.3

Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the problem of matching Bitcoin transactions with feedback

reviews. Table 3.1 shows the main symbols used in this chapter and their definitions.
Let B = (b1 (t1 , u1 , r1 ), b2 (t2 , u2 , r2 ), · · ·, bn (tn , un , rn )) represents the set of all Bitcoin
transactions, where bi (ti , ui , ri ) represents a Bitcoin transaction with three attributes: timestamp ti , money value ui , and receiving address ri . Here we only need receiver part of these
Bitcoin transactions. Let R represent a set of all unique receiving addresses in B. Let
F = (f1 (τ1 , v1 ), f2 (τ2 , v2 ), · · ·, fm (τm , vm )) represents a list of feedback reviews received by
one vendor, where fj (τj , vj ) is a feedback review with two attributes: timestamp τj and
money value vj .
Vendor Receiving Address Set Problem:Finding a set of receiving addresses Rk ⊂
R which are likely the Bitcoin addresses in the vendor’s wallet, according to the matching
between the vendor’s feedback reviews in set F and Bitcoin transactions in set B.
Based on practical observations, the timestamp τj and money value vj in fj (τj , vj )
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Table (3.2) An Example to Illustrate the Vendor Receiving Address Set Problem
Input
all Bitcoin
feedback
transactions B reviews F
b1 (t1 , u1 , r2 )
f1 (τ1 , v1 )
b2 (t2 , u2 , r3 )
f2 (τ2 , v2 )
b3 (t3 , u3 , r4 )
f3 (τ3 , v3 )
b4 (t4 , u4 , r5 )
f4 (τ4 , v4 )
b5 (t5 , u5 , r6 )
f5 (τ5 , v5 )
b6 (t6 , u6 , r1 )
f6 (τ6 , v6 )
b7 (t7 , u7 , r7 )
f7 (τ7 , v7 )
b8 (t8 , u8 , r1 )
b9 (t9 , u9 , r8 )
b10 (t10 , u10 , r1 )
b11 (t11 , u11 , r2 )
b12 (t12 , u12 , r3 )
b13 (t13 , u13 , r4 )
b14 (t14 , u14 , r9 )
b15 (t15 , u15 , r1 )
b16 (t16 , u16 , r3 )
b17 (t17 , u17 , r5 )
b18 (t18 , u18 , r1 )
b19 (t19 , u19 , r3 )
b20 (t20 , u20 , r2 )
b21 (t21 , u21 , r10 )
···

feedback
reviews F

f1 (τ1 , v1 )

f2 (τ2 , v2 )
f3 (τ3 , v3 )

f4 (τ4 , v4 )

f5 (τ5 , v5 )
f6 (τ6 , v6 )
f7 (τ7 , v7 )

After matching
Bitcoin
receiving
transactions addresses
b1 (t1 , u1 , r2 )
r2
b2 (t2 , u2 , r3 )
r3
b3 (t3 , u3 , r4 )
r4
b4 (t4 , u4 , r5 )
r5
b5 (t5 , u5 , r6 )
r6
b6 (t6 , u6 , r1 )
r1
b7 (t7 , u7 , r7 )
r7
b8 (t8 , u8 , r1 )
r1
b9 (t9 , u9 , r8 )
r8
b10 (t10 , u10 , r1 )
r1
b11 (t11 , u11 , r2 )
r2
b12 (t12 , u12 , r3 )
r3
b13 (t13 , u13 , r4 )
r4
b14 (t14 , u14 , r9 )
r9
b15 (t15 , u15 , r1 )
r1
b16 (t16 , u16 , r3 )
r3
b17 (t17 , u17 , r5 )
r5
b18 (t18 , u18 , r1 )
r1
b19 (t19 , u19 , r3 )
r3
b20 (t20 , u20 , r2 )
r2
b21 (t21 , u21 , r10 )
r10

are approximately equal to the timestamp ti and money value ui in a Bitcoin transaction
bi (ti , ui , ri ) respectively, i.e., τj ≈ ti and uj ≈ vi , if bi (ti , ui , ri ) is the corresponding Bitcoin
transaction of the feedback review fj (τj , vj ). By comparing the timestamp and money value
attributes, we can match feedback reviews to Bitcoin transactions thus finding the receiving
addresses. In case the vendor does not change the receiving addresses frequently, many of
their feedback reviews will be matched with Bitcoin transactions with the same receiving
addresses. Problem 3.3 aims at finding a set of receiving addresses Rk ⊂ R whose involved
Bitcoin transactions match the maximum number of feedback reviews in F .
We use a bounding box to find candidate Bitcoin transactions for a feedback review. For
each review, we search the Bitcoin transactions B with a bounding box. We set thresholds
θ and φ to constrict the ranges of timestamp and money value respectively. Currently, there
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Figure (3.2) Bounding Boxes of Timestamp and Money Value for Matching a Feedback
Review with a Bitcoin Transaction

are thousands of Bitcoin transactions every second. We compare a feedback review with a
Bitcoin transaction and we are able to match a review to thousands of candidate transactions
in real data with the range we provided. According to research [29], a Bitcoin transaction
happens within an hour after a buyer posts the review with a high possibility. Therefore,
we use τj ≤ ti ≤ τj + θ as the bounding box for timestamp and set θ = 1 hour. The market
takes 5.5% commission fee and the exchange rate also fluctuates in a day. Therefore, we use
φ1 vj ≤ ui ≤ φ2 vj as the bounding box for money value. If the fluctuation range is 10%, the
setting will be φ1 = (1 − 5.5%)(1 − 10%) = 0.8505 and φ2 = (1 − 5.5%)(1 + 10%) = 1.0395.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the bounding boxes. If a Bitcoin transaction bi (ti , ui , ri ) falls in the
bounding boxes of a feedback review fj (τj , vj ), we say bi and fj are a match, which is formally
defined in Definition 3.3.
fj is matched with bi : A feedback review fj (τj , vj ) is matched with a Bitcoin transaction bi (ti , ui , ri ) if τj ≤ ti ≤ τj + θ and φ1 vj ≤ ui ≤ φ2 vj .
Table 5.2 shows an example. The left part of Table 5.2 shows the input set B of Bitcoin
transactions and the input set F of feedback reviews received by a vendor. Because of the
limited space, only 21 Bitcoin transactions are shown here but B should contain hundreds
of millions of transactions. In the example, the vendor has 7 feedback reviews. The right
part of Table 5.2 shows the matches between the 7 feedback reviews and the 21 Bitcoin
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Table (3.3) Vertical and Binary Format
receiving Bitcoin
address ri
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
r7
r8
r9
r10

feedback reviews
S({ri }) matched with ri
f2 , f3 , f4 , f5 , f6
f1 , f4 , f7
f1 , f4 , f5 , f6
f1 , f4
f1 , f5
f1
f2
f3
f4
f7

support
s({ri })
5
3
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

binary format
representation
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1
1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0
1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1

transactions. To save space, we ignore the concrete values of timestamps and money values
in B and F in the left part. Whenever there is a match, it means that the feedback review
and Bitcoin transaction satisfy Definition 3.3. From the right part of 5.2, we can see that
there could be multiple Bitcoin transactions that are matches of one feedback review. In real
cases, a feedback review could match hundreds of Bitcoin transactions. And the receiving
addresses in those matched Bitcoin transactions are the candidate addresses of the vendor.
In order to accelerate the computation in the later stages, we transfer the matching
results to the vertical and binary formats in Table 3.3. To solve Problem 3.3, we aim at
finding a minimum set of Bitcoin addresses covering all feedback reviews. The intuition is
that a Bitcoin address that can cover many feedback reviews is very likely to belong to the
vendor wallet. This is especially true when the careless vendor infrequently or barely changes
their Bitcoin address.
Let S(R) represents a set function which returns the set of feedback reviews that are
matched with the input set R of Bitcoin addresses. Let s(R) represent a set function which
returns the number of feedback reviews matched with the input set R, i.e., s(R) = |S(R)|.
Theorem 3.3 shows that s(R) is a submodular set function [46].
Given three Bitcoin address sets A, B, C with A ⊆ B ⊆ C and a Bitcoin address

35
r ∈ C \ B, we have
s(A ∪ {r}) − s(A) ≥ s(B ∪ {r}) − s(B)

(3.1)

The left equation s(A∪{r})−s(A) represents the number of feedback reviews that are newly
matched after adding the Bitcoin address r to the set A. Thus, we have s(A ∪ {r}) − s(A) =
s({r}) − |S(A) ∩ S({r})|. Similarly, s(B ∪ {r}) − s(B) = s({r}) − |S(B) ∩ S({r})|. Since
A ⊆ B, A are matched with less or equal feedback reviews than B, i.e., S(A) ⊆ S(B), we
have S(A) ∩ S({r}) ⊆ S(B) ∩ S({r}) thus |S(A) ∩ S({r})| ≤ |S(B) ∩ S({r})|. Therefore,
s({r}) − |S(A) ∩ S({r})| ≥ s({r}) − |S(B) ∩ S({r})|. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.3 exhibits the diminishing returns property, which is the equivalent condition
of a submodular set function. The property can be explained as that the marginal gain from
adding a Bitcoin address to the set R is at least as high as the marginal gain from adding
the Bitcoin address to a superset of R. We aim at finding a receiving address set R with size
k, i.e., |R| = k, which can maximize s(R).
We decompose Problem 3.3 into two steps, which are formulated as Problem 3.3 and
Problem 3.3. Problem 3.3 aims at matching Bitcoin transactions with feedback reviews.
Problem 3.3 aims at searching the optimal set of Bitcoin addresses for a vendor. The output
of Problem 3.3 is the input of Problem 3.3.
Bounding Box Matching Problem: Given the set of Bitcoin transactions B, the
set of feedback reviews F , and the bounding box parameters θ for timestamp, φ1 and φ2 for
money values, the problem aims at finding a family of sets {Si }, where Si represents the set
of feedback reviews covered by candidate receiving address ri .
Maximum Review Coverage Problem: Given a family of sets {Si } with Si representing the set of feedback reviews matched with each ri in bi (ti , ui , ri ) ∈ B and a positive
integer k as the budget for the number of receiving addresses, the problem is finding an address set R with size k, i.e., |R| = k, that are matched with the maximum number of feedback
reviews. That is, finding the optimal solution R of the following optimization problem:
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max s(R)
s.t.

|R| = k

Problem 3.3 can be solved in polynomial time.
Problem 3.3 is NP-hard.

Problem 3.3 can be reduced from the famous Set Cover
S
problem [48]. Let X = {X1 , · · · , Xq } be a family of sets with Y = {y1 , · · · , yp } = qi=1 Xi
being the elements. The NP-complete Set Cover problem aims at finding whether there exist
k of the subsets in {Xi } whose union is equal to Y . Given an arbitrary instance of the Set
Cover problem, we define a corresponding instance of Problem 3.3. For each subset Xi ∈ X,
we create a Bitcoin address ri and a set Si . Therefore, we get a family of sets {Si } and
Rall = {r1 , · · · , rq }, where all ri ’s are unique. For each element yj , we create a feedback
review fj . Therefore, we get F = {f1 , · · · , fp }. We add fj to Si , i.e., ri is matched with fj ,
if and only if Xi contains yj . The Set Cover problem is equivalent to deciding if there is a
set R ⊆ Rall of k Bitcoin addresses with s(R) = p.
3.4

Computing Algorithms
In this section, we discuss how to efficiently compute the problems. We first study the

bounding box and KD tree techniques for matching the Bitcoin transactions with feedback
reviews. We then exploit a greedy algorithm that can obtain an address set that is provably
cover (1 − 1/e) ratio reviews of optimal. Here e is Euler’s number. Finally, we propose
our fast method which can accelerate the whole process by effectively reducing the times of
matching.
3.4.1 Bounding Box and K-D tree
For each pair of feedback review f ∈ F and Bitcoin transaction b ∈ B, we need to
check the inequalities of timestamp and Bitcoin value. Let n = |B| be the number of Bitcoin
transactions in B and m = |F | be the number of feedback reviews in F . It runs in O(mn)
to compare reviews with all Bitcoin transactions.
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Algorithm 4: Build KD Tree(B, η, d) [49]
Input: Bitcoin transaction set B, max depth η, current depth d
Output: a KD-tree T
if d < η then
// d < η, a non-leaf node of the KD-tree
create a KD-tree T with a root node π;
if d is odd then
// d is odd, split by the timestamp
π.t ← the median value of all timestamps in B;
split B into B1 (t < π.t) and B2 (t ≥ π.t) by time;
else
// d is even, split by the money value
π.u ← the median value of all money values in B;
split B into B1 (u < π.u) and B2 (u ≥ π.u) by value;
Tleft ← BuildKDTree(B1 , η, d + 1);
// build the left KD-tree
Tright ← BuildKDTree(B2 , η, d + 1);
// build the right KD-tree
add a left child sub-tree Tleft and a right child sub-tree Tright to π;
else
// d = η, a leaf node of the KD-tree
create a KD-tree T with a single node π containing set B;

To speed up the search process, we build a 2-D tree for the Bitcoin transaction set B
where the 2 dimensions are timestamp and money value. The reason that we build a KD-tree
for B, not for F is that the number n of Bitcoin transactions is generally much larger than
the number m of feedback reviews of a vendor. Algorithm 4 shows a recursive method for
building a KD-tree with a fixed height η from set B. In the even depth nodes of the KD-tree,
timestamp is used for partitioning the Bitcoin transactions. In the odd depth nodes of the
KD-tree, money value is used. To build the entire KD-tree, we call “BuildKDTree(B, η,
d = 1)” in algorithm 4 and pass the entire set B, the maximum depth η of the KD-tree,
and the initial depth d = 1 to the function. Figure 3.3(a) shows an example of building a
KD-tree and Figure 3.3(b) shows the resulting KD-tree. In each depth d, Algorithm 4 needs
a linear time O(n) to find the median and split the set into left and right subsets. Algorithm
4 runs in O(ηn).
Algorithm 5 shows the improved bounding box search algorithm using the KD-tree.
For each feedback review f , Algorithm 5 will find the leaf nodes in the KD-tree that may
contain Bitcoin transactions matched with f . Searching a KD tree runs in O(2η ) in the worst
case. W represents all leaf nodes of the KD-tree that are returned. In general, the number
of returned leaf nodes is small. Suppose on average, the number of returned leaf nodes is
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(a) coordinate system representation

(b) tree representation

Figure (3.3) K-D Tree and Range Searching
Algorithm 5: Bounding Box Search with KD Tree(B, T , F , η, θ, φ1 , φ2 )
Input: Bitcoin transaction set B, KD-tree T built from B, feedback review set F , max depth
η, bounding box parameter θ for timestamp, φ1 and φ2 for money value
Output: a family of sets {Si }, where Si represents the set of feedback reviews matched with
ri in bi (ti , ui , ri ) ∈ B
for each unique ri in bi (ti , ui , ri ) ∈ B do Si ← ∅;
// initialization
fj (τj , vj ) ∈ F : W = KDTreeSearch(root node of KD-tree T , f (τ, v), η, θ, φ1 , φ2 );
bi (ti , ui , ri ) ∈ W : if τj ≤ ti ≤ τj + θ and φ1 vj ≤ ui ≤ φ2 vj then
Si ← Si ∪ {fj };

γ. Since there are 2η leaf nodes, there are O(n/2η ) Bitcoin transactions in each leaf node.
Therefore, Algorithm 5 runs in O((γ + η)mn/2η ) on average. It is much faster than O(mn).
γ is small in our experiments on real data.
3.4.2 Greedy Set Cover Algorithm
Algorithm 6 shows a greedy algorithm with a ratio (1 − 1/e) of optimal for solving
Problem 3.3. In Algorithm 6, we start with an empty address set R0 = ∅, and add a Bitcoin
address ri in each iteration which maximally increases the review coverage s(Ri ).
Algorithm 6 has an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/e). That is, s(Rk ) ≥ (1 − 1/e)s(A∗ )
where A∗ represents the k-size address set which matches maximum reviews and k is the size
of returned address set.
The proof can be found in [50]. The key observation is that s(R) is non-decreasing
submodular set function according to Theorem 3.3.
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Algorithm 6: Greedy Set Cover Algorithm({Si }, λ)
Input: a family of sets {Si }, where Si represents the set of feedback reviews matched with ri
in bi (ti , ui , ri ) ∈ B, a threshold λ ∈ (0, 1)
Output: optimal number k
r1 ← argmaxr∈R s(r); R1 ← {r1 }; i ← 1; // extract the best matching
(s(Ri ) − s(Ri−1 ))/(s(Ri−1 ) − s(Ri−2 )) < λ ri+1 ← argmaxr∈R\Ri (s(Ri ∪ {r}) − s(Ri ));
Ri+1 ← Ri ∪ {ri+1 }, i + +;
return Ri−1 ;

Algorithm 7: Cost-Effective Addresses Searching(B, F , θ, φ1 , φ2 , λ)
Input: Bitcoin transaction set B, feedback review set F , bounding box parameter θ for
timestamp, φ1 and φ2 for money value, a threshold λ ∈ (0, 1)
Output: a set Rk of Bitcoin addresses belonging to a vendor
R0 ← ∅; F 0 ← ∅; α0 ← None; // Stage 1: an address with max coverage
s(α0 ) < |F \ F 0 | Fα0 ← all feedback reviews matched with Bitcoin address α0 ;
f ← select a feedback review from F \ (F 0 ∪ Fα0 ) at random;
R0 ← R0 ∪ { Bitcoin addresses matched with f }; F 0 ← F 0 ∪ {f };
α0 ← argmaxr∈R0 s(r);
// extract the best matching address
R1 ← {α0 }; i ← 1;
// Stage 2: searching for a set of addresses
(s(Ri ) − s(Ri−1 ))/(s(Ri−1 ) − s(Ri−2 )) > λ Fα0 ← all feedback reviews matched with Bitcoin
address α0 ;
F ← F \ Fα0 ; F 0 ← F 0 \ (F 0 ∩ Fα0 );
α0 ← argmaxr∈R0 s(r); // best matching address based on new F
Ri+1 ← Ri ∪ {α0 }; i + +;
return Ri−1 ;

Algorithm 6 can decide the number of addresses to return with a threshold λ. Intuitively
a vendor’s Bitcoin addresses should match many more of their feedback reviews compared
with noise Bitcoin addresses that do not belong to them. This phenomenon is also proved
in our experiments on real-life data. We calculate the ratio of increments in review coverage
in two consecutive iterations. If the ratio is less than a threshold λ ∈ (0, 1), the greedy
algorithm will terminate and output address set.
3.4.3 Cost-Effective Addresses Searching
Algorithm 5 will find matched Bitcoin transactions for all feedback reviews in F . And
the following greedy algorithm 6 will find an optimal address which cover most reviews
iteratively. The whole process is time consuming. In this section, we propose a Cost-
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Effective Addresses Searching(CEAS) algorithm which will find the optimal address with
much less matching calculations between reviews and Bitcoin transactions. The steps are
shown in algorithm 7. In CEAS, we only needs to apply range searching for (|F |−s(rmax )+1)
reviews, where rmax is the address that covers maximum reviews. Therefore s(rmax ) is the
maximum number of reviews matched by a single address. Experiments show that CEAS
can prunes about 60% comparisons between reviews and Bitcoin transactions.
Let F represents full feedback reviews and F 0 represents feedback reviews set which
we have already applied range searching for. R is the address set containing all addresses
and R0 represents address set containing addresses matched by any reviews in F 0 . We have
following theorem.
Let α = argmaxr∈R s(r) and α0 = argmaxr∈R0 s(r). If s(α0 ) ≥ |F \ F 0 |, we have α0 = α.
α is the address in R that matches the maximum number of reviews and α0 is the address
in R0 that matches the maximum number of reviews. For any Bitcoin address r ∈ R \ R0 ,
it doesn’t match any reviews in F 0 . Therefore, the maximum number of reviews that r can
match is |F \ F 0 |. If s(α0 )|F \ F 0 |, address α0 matches more reviews than any address r ∈R
\R0 , which makes α0 the address that matches largest number of reviews in set R. This
completes the proof.
According to Theorem 3.4.3, we can find the optimal address in R0 which is also the
optimal address we could find in R when the condition s(α0 ) ≥ |F \ F 0 | is satisfied. Therefore
we don’t need to apply range searching in KD-tree for all reviews in R to get this optimal
address.
In all addresses R, to find the optimal address which matches maximum number of
reviews in F , The number of feedback reviews |F 0 | we need to apply range searching for is
bounded as |F | − s(rmax ) ≤ |F 0 | ≤ |F | − s(rmax ) + 1.
rmax represents the address in R that matches maximum reviews. s(rmax ) represents the
number of feedback reviews that are matched with the address rmax . To satisfy the condition
s(α0 )|F \ F 0 | in theorem 3.4.3, we have |F 0 | ≥ |F |−s(α0 ) ≥ |F |−s(α) = |F |−s(rmax ). At the
same time, α need to match at least one review in F 0 , which requires at most (|F |−s(rmax )+1)
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times of range searching.
Now we know we need at most (|F | − s(rmax ) + 1) times of range searching to get the
optimal address. In greedy algorithm, we need to repeat this step for k times to obtain the
optimal k-size address set. We can prove that finding the optimal address set still need at
most (|F | − s(rmax ) + 1) times range searching.
To find optimal address set in greedy Algorithm 7, the total number of feedback reviews
|F 0 | we need to apply range searching is still bounded as |F |−s(rmax ) ≤ |F 0 | ≤ |F |−s(rmax )+
1.

After we apply |F | − s(rmax ) or |F | − s(rmax ) + 1 times of range searching to get the

first address. The next address should be the one which matches maximum reviews in
the remaining reviews based on greedy algorithm. We can remove reviews covered by the
first address and use the same method to find the second address which matches maximum
reviews in the remaining reviews. When we select feedback review to apply range searching
in step 4 of algorithm 7, we avoid the reviews which are matched with address α0 . As a result,
in all |F | − s(rmax ) feedback reviews where we apply range searching on, only one feedback
review match with the address rmax . After we remove reviews covered by the address rmax .
In the remaining F − s(rmax ) reviews, there should be |F | − s(rmax ) − 1 reviews that have
already gone through range searching. Now we can update F = (F − s(rmax )) and update
F 0 = (|F | − s(rmax ) − 1). Then the new |F \ F 0 | = ((F − s(rmax )) − (|F | − s(rmax ) − 1) = 1,
which means s(α0 ) ≥ |F \ F 0 | in theorem 3.4.3 is always satisfied. Therefore we don’t need
to apply range searching to any more reviews to find remaining addresses of vendor.
Figure 3.4 explains CEAS Algorithm using the example in Table 5.2. In Figure 3.4,
we use a bipartite graph to represent the matches between feedback reviews and receiver
addresses. Each node on the left represents a feedback review and each node on the right
represents a receiver address. An edge represents that a feedback review is covered by this
address. A dotted edge represents a non-computed match and a solid edge represents a
computed match. We re-order the nodes on both sides to reduce the visual clutter.
In Stage 1, Algorithm 7 randomly selects f1 in line 4 and finds its matched Bitcoin
addresses {r2 , r3 , r4 , r5 , r6 } in line 5. Now F 0 = {f1 } and R0 = {r2 , r3 , r4 , r5 , r6 }. We use black
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(a) after line 4, 5

(b) after line 6, 3

(c) after line 4, 5

(d) after line 6

(e) after line 10

(f) after line 11

Figure (3.4) An Example for the Heuristic Search in Algorithm 7 (F : nodes on the left;
F 0 : black nodes on the left; R0 : black nodes on the right; the “line” refers to the lines in
Algorithm 7)

nodes to represent them in Figure 3.4(a). Algorithm 7 extracts the Bitcoin address r3 from R0
since it has the largest number of matched feedback reviews. In Figure 3.4(b), we use “∗” to
represent the Bitcoin address in R0 with the maximum coverage. Now Fα0 = {f1 , f4 , f5 , f6 }.
Algorithm 7 then randomly selects f2 from the review set F \ (F 0 ∪ Fα0 ) = {f2 , f3 , f7 } in line
4 and finds its matched Bitcoin addresses {r1 , r7 } in line 5. Now R0 = {r1 , r2 , r3 , r4 , r5 , r6 , r7 }
and F 0 = {f1 , f2 }. Figure 3.4(c) shows the status. Algorithm 7 extracts the Bitcoin address
r1 from R0 since it has the largest number of matched feedback reviews, which is shown in
Figure 3.4(d). Since s(rmax ) = s({r1 }) = 5 ≥ |F \ F 0 | = 5, Stage 1 is done.
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In Stage 2, Algorithm 7 first adds the best Bitcoin address r1 into the resulting set thus
rmax = r1 . Since r1 is matched with Fr1 = {f2 , f3 , f4 , f5 , f6 }, Algorithm 7 deletes the reviews
covered by r1 from the left part and the associated edges. Figure 3.4(e) shows the remaining
graph. Now F = {f1 , f7 } and F 0 = {f1 }. Algorithm 7 then selects the best matching address
from R0 based on the new F = {f1 , f7 }. Since r2 has the largest number of matches thus
is optimal. Algorithm 7 will terminate in the next iteration since all feedback reviews have
been covered and the drop is larger than λ.
Here we only need to search matched Bitcoin transactions for f1 and f2 . This is one
possible solution for this example. In algorithm 7, we randomly select review to apply range
searching. No matter how we select reviews, it always needs to apply range searching for
2 or 3 reviews in this example, which is the range of |F 0 |. In this example,2 ≤ |F 0 | ≤ 3
because s(rmax ) = 5 and |F | = 7. In contrast, Algorithm 5 need apply range searching for
all 7 feedback reviews. According to Theorem 3.4.3, Algorithm 7 always finds the same best
Bitcoin address that Algorithm 6 finds.
Time Complexity: Line 5 in Algorithm 7 performs the bounding box search and is the
most time consuming step and dominates the time complexity. This is because the number
of Bitcoin transactions n is much larger than other parameters like m. Based on Theorem
3.4.3, the times of running line 5 is upper bounded by |F 0 | ≤ m−s(rmax )+1. Thus Algorithm
7 runs in O((γ + η)(m − s(rmax ) + 1)n/2η ). Please refer to last paragraph in Section 3.4.1
for more details.
3.5

Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the efficiency and ef-

fectiveness of our method by using both real and synthetic datasets. All algorithms are
implemented in Python and all the experiments are conducted on a Linux Server with Intel
Xeon 3.2GHz CPU and 32 GB main memory.
Datasets. For the real dataset, we crawled feedback from Wall Street Market. Wall
Street Market sells a variety of content, including drugs, stolen data, and counterfeit con-
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sumer goods, all using cryptocurrency. In the Wall Street market, each vendor has a list of
reviews. Each feedback contains the time when the buyer leaves this feedback as well as the
amount of Bitcoin used in this transaction. Here we crawled the feedback of different vendors
and sum the transactions to a file, one transaction was represented by a 2-dimensional data
(τ, v), where τ is the timestamp when this review was posted and v is money cost in this
purchase. Here, we collect transactions of different vendors in Dec 2018. There are in total
17,155,754 Bitcoin transactions during this time. The synthetic dataset is produced by the
Bitcoin transaction data.
Next, we first evaluate the efficiency of K-D tree and greedy algorithm by real dataset
and then the accuracy by synthetic dataset.
3.5.1 Efficiency Evaluation in Range Searching
Each review we have can generate a 2-dimensional range based on the Bitcoin value and
timestamp. With this range, we search the Bitcoin public ledger to find a lot of candidate
transactions matched to this review. Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the K-D tree we build
can effectively save time during range searching. We build a K-D tree with the real dataset,
separating transactions into 16,384 buckets with a 14-depth binary tree. Each bucket contains more than one thousand transactions. We sample reviews from Wall Street Market.
Bitcoin transactions are divided through Bitcoin value and timestamp alternately. Figure
3.5(a) shows the comparison of time-consuming in K-D tree and traversal in full ledger. It
only takes less than 5.5 seconds to find the matched transactions for 1000 reviews in the K-D
tree, nearly 5.5 milliseconds for one review. We also built another K-D Tree with a smaller
data size, including only mixed transactions in Bitcoin public ledger. Users in cryptomarkets
prefer mixed transactions to protect their privacy in Bitcoin transactions. We conduct the
same experiment in this filter ledger which contains 1,395,694 Bitcoin transactions. Figure
3.5(b) shows the result with K-D tree structure; it only takes around 2 milliseconds to find
the matched transactions for a review.
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(a) range searching in full ledger

(b) range searching in filtered ledger

Figure (3.5) Compare Running Time of K-D Tree Searching and Traversal Searching in Full
Ledger and Filter

3.5.2 Effectiveness Evaluation of Greedy Algorithm
Our greedy algorithm guarantees that we can achieve at least (1 − 1/e) of maximum
coverage theoretically. Here we speed up our greedy algorithm by removing low degree
addresses found in range searching and evaluate the performance of the greedy algorithm on
the real dataset.
We select feedback from 100 vendors with 3721 reviews. Matched Bitcoin transactions
of reviews from a vendor can be found through the K-D tree, which helps us get matched
addresses of each review. By changing this data format to vertical format like Table 3.3,
we get the reviews covered by each matched address for a vendor. Now we are looking
for a receiver address set whose transactions can match the maximum reviews. Based on
the range we set, a review can normally be matched to thousands of transactions in the
Bitcoin ledger. Only one of these matched addresses can be the vendor’s address, which
means the remaining addresses are noises in our algorithm. In the experiments, 94.23% of
the addresses we found only match one review. 5.26% of addresses match 2 reviews and
only 0.51% addresses match more than 2 reviews on average. Heuristically we are looking
for addresses that can match the maximum reviews. Therefore, removing addresses with
a low degree will not affect the accuracy of our algorithm. We conduct the simple greedy
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Figure (3.6) Greedy Agorithm Outperform High Degree and Random Method

Figure (3.7) Maximum Reviews Covered by One Address in Ratio for Different Vendors

algorithm without setting a threshold λ. We set k from 1 to 10 as the number of output
addresses. The greedy algorithm needs to output an address set that covers as many reviews
as possible. Result demonstrates that we can save 93% time if we ignore address matching
with only 1 review during the greedy algorithm and 99% time if we remove addresses with
a degree less than 3.
To evaluate the performance in the maximum coverage of the greedy algorithm. We
compare the greedy algorithm with a heuristic high degree method and the random selection
method. The high degree method will select addresses with the maximum review coverage.
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Figure (3.8) Accuracy Comparison Between Vendors with Different Number of Addresses

We average the percentages of reviews covered. From Figure 3.6, we can notice that the
performance of the high degree method is similar to the greedy algorithm when k is small.
As k increases, the gap between these two methods increases.
The number of times in range searching is at most |F | − s(R1 ) + 1 in our proposed
algorithm. We can reduce at least s(R1 ) − 1 times. s(R1 ) is the number of reviews covered
by the first address we get in the greedy algorithm, which also is the address rmax that covers
maximum reviews in F . The more reviews covered by this address, the fewer times of range
searching are required. Figure 3.7 shows the ratio s(R1 )/F of 100 vendors we find in Wall
Street Market. Each node in Figure 3.7 represents a vendor. We can see that the address
which covers the maximum reviews can cover between 35% to 90% of all reviews from a
vendor and 60.217% on average, which means we can reduce times of range searching by
60.217%. We find 66% of these vendors whose reviews can be matched to an address that
covers more than half of the reviews. The result shows the effectiveness of our algorithm
in the real dataset and unveils that the vendors in Wall Street Market do not change their
receiving addresses frequently.
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3.5.3 Accuracy Evaluation on Synthetic Data
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the accuracy of our algorithm on
synthetic reviews. We select 2000 Bitcoin addresses and collect their history transactions.
Each transaction contains timestamp and Bitcoin value received, which can be treated as a
review after a slight change. We apply normal distribution on the amount of change in both
Bitcoin value and timestamp. The number of hours we advance on timestamp follows the
normal distribution with 0.5 mean and 0.6 std. In probability, the newly generated review’s
bounding box in timestamp will cover the transaction at 59% feasibility. The same strategy
is applied to the Bitcoin value. After combining the restrict of timestamp and Bitcoin value,
the newly generated review can match to the original transaction with a 35.4% possibility.
Every address we randomly select from the Bitcoin ledger can generate a synthetic review
list. Considering vendors may use multiple Bitcoin addresses, we also combine some synthetic
reviews generated by different addresses.
Figure 3.8 shows the accuracy of the greedy algorithm with reviews generated by 1
address, 2 addresses, and 3 addresses. Accuracy is the number of correct addresses over
the number of addresses that generate these synthetic reviews. From Figure 3.8, we can
see that longer review lists contribute to better accuracy, while more receiver addresses can
reduce accuracy, which matches the real situation. It is hard to find the vendor’s address
set if the vendor updates their receiver address in the darknet market very frequently. For
vendors who do not change their receiver address frequently, our algorithm can achieve great
performance even with very few reviews.
We set a threshold λ for the ratio of new reviews covered in the current step to new
reviews covered in the last step. We use synthetic data generated by different numbers of
addresses to evaluate the effect of different λ. For reviews generated from one address, Figure
3.9 shows larger λ has better performance because we do not want to select another address
besides the one with the highest degree. Reviews derived from 2 or more addresses share a
similar pattern. Large λ can decrease the accuracy because a high threshold will stop the
greedy algorithm too early and output fewer addresses than the vendor have. The more
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Figure (3.9) F1 Measure Accuracy of Synthetic Data Generated from Different Number of
Addresses

addresses a feedback related, the fast the drop of accuracy after λ pass 0.7. Through the
experiments, we can see λ around 0.7 is the best option for all these data.

3.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the problem of identifying the Bitcoin addresses of a vendor

by matching their feedback reviews with Bitcoin transactions. We firstly construct a KD tree to efficiently match Bitcoin transactions to feedback reviews. After we obtain the
matching relationship between Bitcoin transactions and feedback reviews, we get the address
set by applying a greedy algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal theoretical guarantee.
We further develop a Cost-Effective Address Searching(CEAS) algorithm that can speed up
the process by pruning the search space effectively. Comprehensive experiments on both real
and synthetic datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our methods.
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PART 4

LEARNING INFECTIVITY GRAPH IN CHAT GROUP VIA
TEMPORAL-TEXTUAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL HAWKES PROCESS

In this chapter, we propose an effective model to discover hidden infectivity networks
between members in a group chat.

4.1

Motivation
Telegram, as one of the most popular instant message applications, becomes the base for

criminal activities. For example, the ”Nth Room” case. The ”Nth Room” case is a criminal
case involving blackmail, cybersex trafficking, and the spread of sexually exploitative videos
via the Telegram app between 2018 and 2020 in South Korea. The channel ”Nth Room” in
Telegram is where criminals communicate and commit activities. Telegram also has many
public chat channels with illegal content. We can search the name of darknet market in
Telegram. All these darknet markets manage a public chat channel in Telegram and we can
easily find these chat channels and join them. Learning Granger causality for members in a
chat group is meaningful for law enforcement. The Granger causality among members helps
us to construct an influence network, which is beneficial to discover organizations behind
these criminal activities and the related key person.
Unfortunately, identifying influence between members in a public group chat is not a
simple task when there are thousands of members. Analyzing from a large amount of chat
conversations could be challenging and time-consuming. Existing works about group chat
mainly focus on community detection or topic detection. Farkhund applies data mining and
natural language processing techniques on chat log[51, 52]. They proposed a framework which
extracts the social network from chat logs and summarizes conversation into topics. Anwar
presents a unified social graph based text mining framework to identify digital evidences
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from chat logs data[53], which considers both users’ conversation and interaction data in
group chats to discover overlapping users’ interests and their social ties. However, these
researches didn’t investigate directional impact between members.

4.2

Related Work
We perform a literature review focusing on following two aspects: 1) Problems about

multiparticipant chat analysis and how these have been addressed. 2) Hawkes processes for
their dominant usages in self- exciting or mutual-exciting event sequence learning subsectionMultiparticipant Chat Communications through instant message applications have remained under a substantial study over the last few years. Due to increasing popularity, both
structural and textual content of chat data are being investigated in various perspectives.
Researchers have mainly focused on problems including preprocessing of text data[54–56],
conversations disentanglement [57–60], topic detection[51, 52, 61] and community detection
in chat logs[51–53, 62, 63].
There is a lot of overlap between chat preprocessing techniques and those used in other
forms of microtext— normalizing the unusual, informal text characteristics. Each has described an expanded taxonomy of semiotic classes for text[54]. Sproat and Jaitly present
a recurrent neural net (RNN) model of text normalization[56], where they model text normalization as a sequence-to-sequence problem. Chua et al. describes an automated multilanguage text normalization infrastructure that prepares textual data to train language models used in Google’s keyboards and speech recognition systems, across hundreds of language
varieties[55].
A common phenomenon in group chats is that multiple conversations are mixed together. In group chat, a newly sent message may not be the response of the latest message
when multiple conversations occur simultaneously. Therefore thread disentanglement is one
of the major task in group chat analysis. In [57], Elsner proposes a graph-theoretic model
for disentanglement, using discourse-based features which have not been previously applied
to thread disentanglement. Focusing on NLP techniques on real dataset, Kauttonen an-
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alyzed two conversational corpora: A public library question-answering (QA) data and a
private medical chat data they developed response retrieval (ranking) models using TF-IDF,
StarSpace, ESIM and BERT methods [60]. For researchers who want to learn their thread
disentanglement models with annotated datasets, Kummerfeld et al. released a new dataset
of 77,563 messages manually annotated with reply-structure graphs that both disentangle
conversations and define internal conversation structure[58].
Topic detection and community detection is high level analysis in group chat analysis.
Many efforts have been made to extract key topics and network from large chat logs. In
[51, 52], Iqbal first discovers the communities based on the co-occurrence frequencies of the
entities in chat sessions, further they mine corresponding concepts by identifying important
terms based on their frequency in the text. Anwar presents a unified social graph based
text mining framework to identify digital evidence from chat logs data[53]. To study the
characteristics of chat messages, Dong et al. analyzes a collection of 33,121 sample messages
gathered from 1,700 sessions of conversations and concludes indicative term-based approach
is superior to the traditional document frequency based approach, for feature selection in
chat topic categorization[61]. In this chapter, we work with Hawkes process model to extract
mutual influence factors, instead of detecting communities directly.
4.2.1 Hawkes Process
Hawkes processes [64] have been widely used to model time-series events where the occurrences of previous events could trigger the occurrences of future events. Those models
successfully discover the influence network among events and predict future time-dependent
event sequences. Researchers link triggering kernels of Hawkes process to granger causality
of different event types successfully[65–70]. It has been utilized in areas including earthquake
shocks prediction[71, 72], financial markets analysis [73, 74], health analysis[69, 75] and criminal activities[70, 74].
Several teams have achieved remarkable results in Hawkes process for mutual-exciting
event sequence learning. Zhou et al. focuses on the nonparametric learning of the triggering
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kernels in Hawkes process[67], proposing an approach to discover the hidden network of social
influence in sparse low-rank networks[66]. Linderman develops a probabilistic model that
combines Hawkes processes with random graph models and discovers the latent network
of stock trading, gangs activities and calcium imaging[74, 76]. Through an infinite order
autoregression, Eichler designs a new nonparameteric estimator of the impact functions of
the Hawkes process[65]. They apply this model to neural spike train data and study the
mutual-exciting networks of spinal dorsal horn neurons under different conditions. Xu et
al. represents the kernel functions with a series of basis functions and extract the influence
graph through group sparsity of the kernel functions’ coefficients.[68].
Howkes process can also be modeled to predict time series data. Xu et al. develops a
novel framework based on Hawkes process to predict patient flow[69]. His team further model
incomplete sequence data with Hawkes process by leveraging the idea of data synthesis[77].
They also discuss an effective model-based clustering method based on a novel Dirichlet
mixture model of Hawkes process[78].
Most of the kernel functions of Hawkes process in existing works are decaying functions
like power-law functions or exponential functions based on time. In this chapter we embed
the text information from group chat into the kernel function of Hawkes process to describe
a more precise influence network.

4.3

Proposed Model
As time series data, the chat history of a group can be considered as event sequence set

C = {S 1 , S 2 , ...}, where sequence S k represents a segment of chat in a chat group. Every
S k = (m1 k , m2 k , ...) is a sequence of message mi k = (ti k , di k , xi k ) where ti k is time when
the message was sent, di k is the member identity who sent this message and xi k is the text
content.
To uncover the latent infectivity network in group chat, our method contains two steps.
dialogue Classifier: For a message mj in group chat, to find which message it replied to,
we embed each pair of messages (mi , mj ) to a number eij ∈ {0, 1} based on semantics in
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text from mi and mj . Here eij classify whether that message mj replies to mi semantically.
Text biased Marked Multi-dimensional Hawkes Process: We model the chat history
with a multi-dimensional hawkes process. In this model, message sequences in chat history
are event sequences and the sender of the message is marked as the type of this event. We
train this model based on observed chat history with learned dialogue classifiers.
4.3.1 Dialogue Classifier
In group chat, we want to get the relationship between the current message and previous
messages semantically. They could be irrelevant or the current message is the response to
one or several previous messages.
In this chapter, we pretrain text pairs with a BERT model, followed by a classifier.
BERT is designed to pretrain deep bidirectional representations from text by jointly conditioning on both left and right context in all layers[79]. It’s empirically powerful and has
obtained state-of-art results on several natural language processing tasks. We input two
texts to Bert pretained model which converts text pairs to a vector. This vector is further
input to a downstream task classifier to fine-tune the pretrained Bert model. The classifier
will classify whether the second text is a reply to the first text or not semantically. The
output of the last layer should be a number e ∈ {0, 1}. Here e = 0 means it is not a reply
and e = 1 represents it is. We can use this output number as the measure of the second text
replying to the first text.
For message mi , the message it replies to should be close with message mi in time.
In group chat, members normally wouldn’t reply to a message a long time ago. Therefore,
it’s not necessary to calculate reply embedding of each pair of messages and only consider
message pairs Within a limited time frame.
4.3.2 Temporal-Textual Multi-dimensional Hawkes Process
Although hawkes process can model time series sequence, there are two limitations of the
one-dimensional hawkes process for our problem. One is that it can only model a single type
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of event. If we want to capture the interacting processes between members in a chat group,
message sequences from different members should be treated as different types of events.
Another limitation is that triggering the kernel only decays with time difference. Reply
embedding of message pairs can also help us quantify the influence of a past event on the
new event. If two messages are not classified as a conversation, we are supposed to know the
previous message will not trigger the later message. Therefore we need a multi-dimensional
hawkes process including reply embedding.
In our problems, message sequences in chat history are event sequences that we try
to model. Sender d of the message could be marked as the type of this message. Multidimensional hawkes process can capture the mutual excitations among different types of
events. Instead of using α to represent influence strength from previous events, we have
matrix A = [αij ] capturing the mutual influence in a group.

Given event sequences

((t1 , d1 ), (t2 , d2 ), ...), the intensity function of type d at time t is
X

λd (t) = µd +

αdj d · g(t − tj )

(4.1)

j:tj <t

where µd is exogenous base intensity of event type d. Here it means base activity level
of user d in this group chat. The second term on the right side are influence from previous
messages. αdj d is the strength of influence from person dj on person d in this group.
If the new message is not a reply to a previous message, this new message is not
triggered by this previous message. To leverage text information between current message
mi (ti , di , xi ) and a previous message mj (tj , dj , xj ), we update trigger kernel from g(ti − tj )
to g(ti − tj ) · h(xj , xi ), where h(xj , xi ) ∈ {0, 1} is the reply embedding. Give chat history
((t1 , d1 , x1 ), (t2 , d2 , x2 ), ...), the intensity function of member d at time t with text x is

λd (t, x) = µd +

X

αdj d · g(t − tj ) · h(xj , x)

(4.2)

j:tj <t

Here we utilize the reply embedding h(xj , x) to filter the influence from previous mes-
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sages. Only messages responded by a new message have influence on the occurrence of this
new message.
4.3.3 Learning Task
To find the infectivity matrix A = [αij ], we need to derive the likelihood function of this
hawkes model. Suppose we have a chat history H = ((t1 , d1 , x1 ), (t2 , d2 , x2 ), ...(tn , dn , xn )),
Let F (t|H) be the conditional probability that next message (tn+1 , dn+1 , xn+1 ) appears before
time t, where t > tn . We have F (t|H) = P (tn+1 < t). And let p(t|H) be the corresponding
conditional probability density function. Then we have expected instantaneous happening
rate of message λ(t) = p(t|H)/(1−F (t|H)), from where we can get the conditional probability
density function for a specific member d with text x as

pd (t, x|H) = λd (t, x) · e−
Here e−

Rt
tn

λ(τ )dτ

Rt
tn

λ(τ )dτ

(4.3)

is the probability that the next message appears after time t based on

given history H. λd (t, x) is the intensity function of user d at time t sending text x.
Let event sequence S = {(ti , di , xi )}N
i=1 represents chat history we observed in t ∈ [0, T ],
we can derive the likelihood function of observed sequence as:
N
Y

−

pdi (ti , xi |Hi )e

RT
tN

λ(τ )dτ

(4.4)

i=1

where Hi is the history events before time ti .
Put intensity function into equation(4), the log-likelihood can be expressed as:

L(A) =

N
X

log µdi +

i=1

−

X
d

i−1
X

!
αdj di · βe−β(ti −tj ) · h(xj , xi )

j=0

µd · T +

N
XX
d

!
αdj d (1 − e−β(T −tj ) )

(4.5)

j=1

The learning problem is to find the matrix A = [αji ] that maximizes log-likelihood
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function L(A).
4.3.4 EM Algorithm
We need to find Matrix A = [aij ] that maximizes log-likelihood function L(A). From
research [80], L(A) is concave. We can apply EM algorithm to solve this optimization
problem iteratively. In particular, we construct a tight lower-bound likelihood function for
current parameter estimation by Jensen’s inequality:

L(A) ≥

N
i−1
X
X
i=1

j=1

−

X

pji log

αdj di · βe−β(ti −tj ) · h(xj , xi )
µd
+ pii log i
pji
pii

µd · T +

!

N
XX
d

d

αdj d (1 − e−β(T −tj ) )

(4.6)

j=1

Here pii represents the probability that ith event occurred due to base intensity µdi . And
pji can be interpreted as the probability that the ith event is triggered by the j th event. We
P
have j=i
j=1 pji = 1.
We can maximize our log likelihood by maximizing this lower bound. The EM algorithm
for the estimation of the parameters is as follows. Starting with a guess A = [αji ] for the
parameters, iterate the following until convergence is reached:
Expectation-step:
(m)

µd i

(m)
pii

=

(m)
pji

αdj di · βe−β(ti −tj ) · h(xj , xi )
= (m) Pi−1 (m)
µdi + j=0 (αdj di · βe−β(ti −tj ) · h(xj , xi ))

(m)

µdi +

Pi−1

(m)

−β(ti −tj ) · h(x , x ))
j
i
j=0 (αdj di · βe

(4.7)

(m)

(4.8)

Maximization-step:
(m)

PN
µ(m+1)
u

=

i=1,di =u

T

pii

(4.9)
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Pi−1
(m)
i=1,di =v
j=1,dj =u pji
PN
−β(T −tj ) )
j=1,dj =u (1 − e
PN

(m+1)
αuv

=

(4.10)

Here u, v can represent any uses in group chat. It’s guaranteed that EM algorithm is
able to converge to the global maximum. We won’t show details here.

4.4

Experiments
In this section, we first compare the performance of bert-based language model with

XLNet-based language model in classification. we then conduct experiments using synthetic
group chat generated from different sources of dialogue and real world group chat from telegram to fully evaluate the performance of our developed temporal-textual multi-dimensional
Hawkes model in infectivity Graph learning.
4.4.1

Dialogue Classifier Comparisons

Bert, as the state of art language representation model, is designed to pre-train deep
bidirectional representations from text by jointly conditioning on both left and right context
in all layers[79]. Before the emergence of Bert, existing approaches like ELMo and OpenAI
GPT use unidirectional language models to learn general language representations. Bert
alleviates the unidirectionality constraint by using a “masked language model” (MLM) pretraining objective. Besides Bert, another state of art language representation model XLNet
also has the capability of modeling bidirectional contexts [81].
Here we compare the performance of the Bert-based model with the XLNet-based model
with the same size parameters. We train and test accuracy of the dialogue classifier based on
data we crawled from telegram group channels. In telegram, users are able to click the reply
button to reply to a specific utterance in group chat. Therefore a small part of utterance
in group chat explicitly shows which utterance it replies to and we are able to parse these
dialogue pairs of sentences. We can also select two random texts from group chat to create
a non-dialogue sentence pair.
Dialogue Datasets Besides chat logs from telegram, we train and test the performance
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of dialogue classifiers with some public chitchat data as well. Here are the dialogue dataset
we used to train and evaluate our models.
• BSTalk BlendedSkillTalk is a dataset of 7k conversations explicitly designed to exhibit
multiple conversation modes: displaying personality, having empathy, and demonstrating knowledge [82].
• ConvAI A dataset of Human-bot dialogues containing free discussions of randomly
chosen paragraphs from SQuAD.
• CMUDoG CMU Document Grounded Conversations is a document grounded dataset
for text conversations, where the documents are Wikipedia articles about popular
movies. Consists of 4112 conversations with an average of 21.43 turns per conversation[83].
• DSTC7 DSTC7 provides a dataset of dialogs that are derived from collections of twoparty conversations. The conversations are randomly split part way through to create
a partial conversation and the true follow-up response.[84].
• PersonaChat(PC) A chit-chat dataset where paired Turkers are given assigned personas and chat to try to get to know each other response.[85].
Table4.1 shows the data size of training data, which is the number of sentences pairs. Table5.1
shows the classifier accuracy in different datasets. We can see the bert-based language model
outperform the XLNet-based model in all of these datasets.

Table (4.1) Data Size
Training Data
Size

Telegram BSTalk
33368
104898

ConvAI
5602

CMUDoG DSTC7
38082
27882

PC
48547
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Table (4.2) Accuracy of Dialogue Classifiers
Model
Bert-based
XLNet-based

Telegram BSTalk
0.8044 0.9343
0.7154
0.8692

ConvAI
0.7068
0.5524

CMUDoG DSTC7
0.7732
0.7881
0.5031
0.6994

PC
0.8452
0.7525

4.4.2 Synthetic Data
The hard part of evaluation is that we can’t access the ground truth of the influence
network from public group chat logs. To illustrate that the proposed methods can precisely
extract the underlying influence network from observed chat sequences, we first conduct a
set of experiments in synthetic group chat generated from well-known dialogues data. We
applied Ogata’s thinning algorithm to simulate a multi-dimensional Hawkes process and get
the trigger of each event from previous events[86]. After we have timestamp and user for each
event in simulated Hawkes process, we further embed dialogues texts from some well-known
open source chitchat data to create synthetic group chat. In the simulated Hawkes process,
if a user d1 reply to user d2 , the text embedded for d1 should be a replied text for d2 ’s text
in dialogue chitchat.
Here, we consider a n-dimensional Hawkes process. We random select n from 4 to 1000
for 100 times. We have n users in a group, d1 , d2 , d3 .... dn . In particular, we consider two
different types of influence matrix A in our experiments.
• Random Relationship For a random relationship case, we generate a matrix A where
αij is sampled randomly from [0,1] for i! = j. The exogenous base intensity of each
user is set to 0.01.
• Sub Group Relationship For sub group relationship case, we will assume there are
2 sub groups during n users. Users d1 to dn/2 are closely connected. User dn/2+1 to dn
are close friends as another sub group. We assign high value to influence inside each
sub group. We also assign low value to influence between users in different sub groups.
Here we will simulate 2 Hawkes Process at the same time with an influence matrix
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A. These two Hawkes Process start with users from different groups. As a result, we
generate group chats where two conversations are mixed together.
Dialogue Datasets In generated data, we utilize some public dialogue datasets to
create conversations inside synthetic group chat. The datasets we applied in our experiments
are the same datasets we used to train the dialogue classifier, including BSTalk, ConvAI,
CMUDoG, DSTC7 and PersonaChat(PC).
Evaluation Metric We use two evaluation metrics to measure the performance:
• AveErr AveErr is defined as average error between real influence weight and the
0

ij
for αij 6= 0
extracted influence matrix. i.e. αij−α
αij

• PearsonCor PearsonCor is defined as averaged Pearson correlation coefficient between
real influence matrix A and extracted influence matrix A0 , which meansures the linear
correlation between αij and α0 ij
Models We extracted an influence matrix with four different models and compared the
results. Here are the methods we applied to
• TimeWindow(TW) We set a fixed length time window. An influence weight αij is
calculated based on the number of times user j speaks after user i within the fixed
time length.
• NR NR is the number of replies. Based on the reply embedding. A influence weight
αij is calculated based on the total reply embedding between user j and user i
• MHP MHP represents the Multi-dimensional Hawkes Process. This method will
model message sequences in a group chat to a multi-dimensional Hawkes process and
learn the Granger causality between different individuals by expectation-maximization
algorithm
• TTMHP TTMHP represents the Temporal-Textual Multi-dimensional Hawkes Process. This is our proposed method in this paper which embed the text information of
group chat into the multi-dimensional Hawkes process
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Table (4.3) Experiments Result
Matrix

Type
Random

AveErr
Subgroup

Random
PearsonCor
Subgroup

Method
TW
NR
MHP
TTMHP
TW
NR
MHP
TTMHP
TW
NR
MHP
TTMHP
TW
NR
MHP
TTMHP

BSTalk
0.942
0.988
0.407
0.399
0.866
0.890
0.625
0.289
0.697
0.769
0.734
0.867
0.584
0.980
0.366
0.996

ConvAI
0.964
0.959
0.369
0.368
0.859
0.919
0.610
0.425
0.546
0.704
0.761
0.947
0.577
0.851
0.147
0.947

CMUDog
0.977
0.956
0.511
0.486
0.857
0.930
0.576
0.295
0.488
0.583
0.616
0.940
0.522
0.891
0.430
0.966

DSTC7
0.947
0.936
0.443
0.352
0.842
0.922
0.631
0.326
0.665
0.787
0.745
0.861
0.549
0.955
0.291
0.952

PC
0.965
0.932
0.492
0.422
0.845
0.899
0.625
0.384
0.558
0.692
0.713
0.938
0.529
0.841
0.216
0.943

Table 4.3 shows the average error and average Pearson correlation coefficient from our
experiments. From the result, we can see our proposed model, Temporal-Textual Multidimensional Hawkes Process, achieves lowest error and highest correlation coefficient with
these five group chat logs generated by different types of dialogues.
For random relationship group chat, we can see Hawkes process model including MHP
and TTMHP get better results compared to Time window model and NR model. The time
window model can capture the influence based on timestamp. NR model is calculated based
on reply embedding. The performance of Hawkes process model implies that the Hawkes
Process can successfully extract the trigger pattern between utterances in group chat.
For the sub group relationship case, our proposed TTMHP model still achieves the
best result. Model NR is better than MHP in Pearson correlation coefficient. The reason
is that model NR can capture the text information in group chat. When the group chat
data is a combination of several sub groups, some close posts in a group chat could belong
to different topics. Models like NR and TTMHP that utilize text information can extract
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(a) node in-degree distribution

(b) node out-degree distribution

Figure (4.1) In-degree Distribution and Out-degree Distribution of an Telegram Group Chat
Channel

subgroup relationships better than models like Time window and MHP that only utilize time
difference.
4.4.3 Telegram Data and Case Study
To better understand the performance of the Temporal-Textual Multi-dimensional
Hawkes Process model on real data, we apply our proposed model to chat logs from telegram
group channels.
For the influence network we extracted, most members only interact with a few members or don’t interact with others in the group. Figure 4.1 shows the influence’s in-degree
distribution and out-degree distribution of an example channel in telegram. We can tell most
people have low influence on others, which matches the reality that most people don’t know
each other in an online chat group.
Figure 4.2 shows an infectivity network of a 30 members group channel. In this graph,
each node represents a user in this group and a directed weighted edge represents the influence
between users. To provide a more straightforward insight of the influence network, we let
the width of the edge proportional to influence coefficient and size of node proportional to
in-degree of influence. Here yellow nodes represent the normal members in this group and
the red node ”Guitar” represents the administrator of this group. From this graph, node
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Figure (4.2) Influence Network of an 80 Members Telegram Channel

”Guitar” has the maximum in-degree influence. By checking the chat history of this group,
we found that the user ”Guitar” answered a lot of questions and helped other members in this
group. This indicates the influence graph can reflect the trigger pattern of this group chat.
Such kind of information can provide investigative insight for law enforcement to analyze
the organization structure of members in these online groups.

4.5

Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of learning infecivity graph from group chat logs.

We firstly implement a dialogue classifier which can classify whether the second text is a
reply for the first text semantically when we input two sentences. We convert the group
chat log to an event sequence where every utterance is an event and the member who post
this message is the event type. We model the event sequence with multi-dimensional Hawkes
process and embed the text information we extracted through the dialogue classifier to kernal
function of the Hawkes process model. By applying an EM algorithm, we successfully extract
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the trigger pattern between members inside a group channel. Comprehensive experimental
results show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed methods.
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PART 5

CLUSTERING OF ACCOUNTS IN ONLINE MESSAGING SOFTWARE
THROUGH ATTRIBUTED HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION
NETWORKS

In this part, we propose an effective model to learn the embedding of each account in
group chat. We further train a classifier to identify accounts that belong to the same user.

5.1

Motivation
The privacy of participants in illicit online transactions is protected through two parts.

One is the platform where vendors sell their products and the other is the emergence of
cryptocurrency.
Instant Message software like Telegram, providing public channels for users to discuss
and conduct illegal activities[9, 53], become one of biggest platforms for illicit sales.
Telegram offers users a completely free open-source platform without any ads, a clean
interface, and (the biggest selling point) security[87]. One important feature of Telegram
is being able to search the channels posts, group messages, individual messages or any
kind of communications or posts. This feature is available for both cell phone applications
and the Web-based Telegram interface making it possible to reach any content by simply
searching[88, 89]. This essentially makes Telegram one of the largest free databases available
to the public, especially considering the fact that many other media outlets, including Google,
Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook, are constantly removing illegal posts. Even though there
are illegal activities in these chat channels, administrators of these group channels still keep
these channels public to let new buyers and vendors join the channel easily. Users of Telegram
can search product names in Telegram and they are able to find related chat channels easily
without any effort. Figure 5.1 shows the result of searching the keyword ”silkroad” in
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Figure (5.1) Searching SilkRoad in Telegram

Telegram. SilkRoad is one of the most famous darknets that sell drugs[90]. After joining
these channels, buyers can see the vendors posts about their products in the chat channel and
vendors can advertise their products periodically. If the buyer is interested in the product
posted by the vendor, he or she can discuss details with the vendor in the group channel or
create a private chat channel with the vendor.
To combat these illegal sales, it’s critical for law enforcement to know the organizations
of users in these group chat channels and analyze influence networks. However, no matter
vendors or buyers, they normally maintain multiple accounts in the Telegram platforms. To
track the ecosystem of users and build a network of the users, it’s critical that we are able
to link different accounts belonging to the same user.
Given the large number of users and millions of chat logs, it’s impossible to manually
label accounts of the same user and cluster them. Therefore, there is an urgent need to
develop a model which can automatically identify accounts belonging to one user or different
users.

68

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 review related work,
followed by the proposed methods in Section 3. Section 4 details our experiments. Section
5 shows case study and section 6 concludes the paper.

5.2

Related Work
We perform a literature review focusing on the following two aspects: 1) Study on

Telegram data 2) Time series data representation learning. 3) Graph Node representation
learning
5.2.1 Telegram
Telegram is an instant message application that can be accessed by a wide range of users.
To protect user’s privacy, Telegram provides encryption services for their customers, which
can prevent potential eavesdroppers – including software developers and internet providers.
However, these privacy-protecting and convenient software has been utilized by criminals for
illegal activities like drug smuggling, online fraudulence or even anti-social activities[9]. In
recent years, a lot of works analyze the criminal activities data from Telegram[89, 91–93].
Anglano presents a methodology for the forensic analysis of the artifacts generated on
Android smartphones by Telegram Messenger[91]. Their methodology is based on the design
of a set of experiments suitable to elicit the generation of artifacts and their retention on
the device storage. Satrya also presents a thorough description of all the artifacts that are
generated by the messenger application Telegram on Android OS[92]. Gregorio did similar
work for Windows phone, focusing particularly on how the information is structured and the
user, chat and conversation data generated by the application are organized, with the goal
of extracting related data from the information[93]. However, none of these works are trying
to identify different accounts that are managed by the same user.
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5.2.2 Time Series Representation Learning
The aim of time series representation learning is to learn the embedding of time series
data that can be used to measure the similarity of two time series data. Learning universal
representations for time series is a fundamental but challenging problem.
Yue presents TS2Vec, a universal framework for learning representations of time series
in an arbitrary semantic level. Unlike existing methods, TS2Vec performs contrastive learning in a hierarchical way over augmented context views, which enables a robust contextual
representation for each timestamp.[94]. Lei proposing an efficient representation learning
framework that is able to convert a set of time series with various lengths to an instancefeature matrix. In particular, they guarantee that the pairwise similarities between time
series are well preserved after the transformation, thus the learned feature representation is
particularly suitable for the time series clustering task.[95] Eldele proposes an unsupervised
Time-Series representation learning framework via Temporal and Contextual Contrasting
(TS-TCC), to learn time-series representation from unlabeled data[96]. These work measure
similarity of two time series data with classic methods such as Mikowski distance, crosscorrelation, Kullback-Leibler divergence, dynamic time warping(DTW) similarity, movesplit-merge(MSM) distance, and short time series(STS) distance. These researches focus
on the time series data instead of timestamp. In our problem, we want to know the similarity of two timestamp lists, which can’t be accurately measured by methods like dynamic
time warping. We develop a machine learning model that can learn the representation of
a time stamp list and measure the similarity between two timestamp lists through learned
embedding.
5.2.3 Graph Node Representation Learning
Since most real-world data can be conveniently represented by graphs, research on graph
representation learning has received increasing attention in recent years[97].
Classical graph embedding methods can be divided into linear and nonlinear categories.
Linear methods include: Principal component analysis (PCA)[98], Linear discriminant anal-
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Figure (5.2) System Architecture

ysis (LDA)[99] and Multidimensional scaling (MDS)[100]. Non-linear dimensionality reduction methods include: Isometric feature mapping (Isomap)[101], Locally linear embedding
(LLE)[102] and Kernel methods[103].
Random-walk-based methods sample a graph with a large number of paths by starting
walks from random initial nodes. DeepWalk learns these latent representations to encode
social relations in a continuous vector space. DeepWalk summarizes recent advances in
language modeling and unsupervised feature learning from word sequences to graphs[104].
node2vec is a modified version of DeepWalk, which defines a flexible notion of a node’s
network neighborhood and design a biased random walk procedure[105]. Our node representation learning method utilizes the time pattern and text. We sample meta paths from
the AHIN we built and construct biased random walks.

5.3

Proposed Method
An overview of our developed system for accounts clustering in Telegram is shown in

Figure 5.2. In this section, we introduce the detailed methods integrated in the model to
identify accounts belonging to the same user.
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Figure (5.3) Auto-encoder Structure

5.3.1 Time Pattern Representation Learning
To construct an attributed network, the first step is to learn the attribution for each
node. For node type ”time pattern”, we need to learn the hidden properties of each timestamp list.
From telegram chat logs, we are able to extract posts of each account as well as timestamp of each post. Accounts belonging to one user should display similarities in time pattern
for post. The similarity is not just measured by the Euclidean distance of two timestamp
lists. User’s time zone, location, work routine may affect the timestamp list. For example,
some users prefer to post in the morning, some may prefer night and some may only work on
weekdays. There also might exist some relationships between timestamps of user’s different
posts. To gather all of this information into a relational vector whose distance can represent
the similarity level is not an easy task.
In this paper, we propose to build an auto-encoder to learn the hidden properties of
these timestamp lists because we don’t have enough labeled data. Different from other
dimensionality reduction methods, auto-encoder not only reduces dimensionality, but can
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also detect repetitive structures[106]. We believe this is a good property for our situation.
Users post the advertisements of their products repeatedly in group chat channels.
In the encoder part, we tried different types of neural networks and experiments in part 4
shows convolutional neural network encoders perform best among all these types of encoders.
CNNs were well known in the computer vision and machine learning communities[107].
AlexNet shows, for the first time, that the features obtained by learning can transcend
manually-designed features, breaking the previous paradigm in computer vision. [108].Our
CNN encoder shows similar design philosophies with AlexNet.
Figure 5.3 shows the details of each layer in encoder and decoder. First of all, We
preprocess each timestamp list to a vector. Here we only record the timestamp list of each
account from the last 3 month. In total there are 12 weeks which are 2016 hours long. We use
a 2016 × 1 vector to represent the timestamp list, each value in this vector is the number of
posts in that hour. Hour is the smallest time unit we would consider. In our encoder, we have
convolutional layers, max pooling layer and fully connected layer. In the first convolutional
layer, we set the filter’s size as 24 which can convolute timestamps in consecutive 24 hours.
After the max pooling layer, each data is the learned embedding of one day long. The second
convolutional layer’s filter size is 7, which will convolute timestamps in a week. Followed by
the last convolutional layer which will convolute timestamps in 4 weeks. Decoder’s designs
are opposite layers of related encoder layers.
By training the auto-encoder, we get the hidden features we want to measure the similarity of the timestamp list. The encoder is the model we want to utilize to learn the
representations of timestamp lists. We can get the low dimensional embedding of each
timestamp list by process timestamp list through the learned encoder.
5.3.2 Text Features Extractions
Except for the time pattern, our model leverages the text post by the account as well.
Therefore we also need to learn the representations of post text in group chat channels.
In this paper, we learn the representation of text by a pre-trained language model,
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BERT. BERT is designed to pre-train deep bidirectional representations from text by jointly
conditioning on both left and right context in all layers[79]. It’s empirically powerful and
has obtained state-of-art results on several natural language processing tasks. We input one
text to a pre-trained BERT model which converts text to a vector.
5.3.3 AHIN Construction
To describe vendors, time patterns, texts, product-related attributes, and the rich relationships between them, we propose to use the attributed Attributed Heterogeneous Information Network (AHIN) for representation.
Attributed Heterogeneous Information Network (AHIN)[109]:

Let T

=

{T1 , ..., Tm } be a set of m object types. For each type Ti , let Xi be the set of objects of
type Ti and Ai be the set of attributes defined for objects of type Ti . An object xj of
type Ti is associated with an attribute vector fj = (fj1 , fj2 , ..., fj|Ai | ). An AHIN is a graph
G = (V, E, A), where V = ∪m
i=1 Xi is a set of nodes, E is a set of edge, each represents a
binary relation between two objects in V , and A = ∪m
i=1 Ai .
To better understand the schema level of the AHIN we built, we provide a meta-level
description.
Network Schema[109, 110]: A network schema is the meta template of an AHIN
G = (V, E, A). Let (1) ψ : V → T be an object-type mapping that maps an object in V into
its type, and (2) ψ : E → R be a link-relation mapping that maps a link in E into a relation
in a set of relations R. The network schema of an AHIN G, denoted by TG = (T , R), shows
how objects of different types are related by the relations in R. TG can be represented by a
schematic graph with T and R being the node set and the edge set, respectively. Specifically,
there is an edge (Ti , Tj ) in the schematic graph iff there is a relation in R that relates objects
of type Ti to objects of type Tj .
Figure 5.4 shows the network schema of our application. In our network, we have four
node types and five binary relations. Two accounts can be connected via different paths
through our heterogeneous network.
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Figure (5.4) Network Schema

Meta path P is a path defined on the graph of network schema TG [111], which include types, nodes and relations. A meta path is symmetric if the relation defined by it is
symmetric.
In our application, we are able to find the same text post by different accounts or same
products by different accounts. Therefore, we can create symmetric meta paths with product
nodes or post nodes as bridges. Figure 5.5 shows the four most meaningful symmetric meta
paths we applied to present relationships between two accounts in Telegram from different
views. MP1 means two accounts are connected by posting the same product in the Telegram
group chat channel. MP2 means two accounts are connected by posting the same text. MP3
denote that two accounts can be linked if they posted the text describing the same product
with similar time pattern. MP4 represents that two accounts can be linked if they post the
same text with similar timestamps.
5.3.4 The User2Vec Model
We present a framework, User2Vec, which is capable of learning account representations
in the attributed heterogeneous network we built. The desirable node representations should
be low dimensional and preserve the context of each node in the heterogeneous network.
Given a heterogeneous network as input, we formalize the problem of heterogeneous
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Figure (5.5) Meta path

network representation learning as follows.
Attributed Heterogeneous Network Representation Learning[112]: Given a
heterogeneous network G = (V, E, A), the task is to learn the d-dimensional latent representations R|V|×d , d  |V| that are capable of capture the structural and semantic relations
among them.
We first introduce the embedding method for homogeneous networks and heterogeneous
networks. Mikolov et al. proposed Word2Vec which can learn the embedding of each word
from the context in a given text corpus[113]. By applying the same idea, DeepWalk and
Node2vec learn the node embedding from the context of each node in network [104]. Both
methods sample paths from the network through random walks and transfer the network
structure into a skip-gram model and embed the nodes to the low dimensional vectors.
To learning the embedding of heterogeneous network with similar solution, metapath2Vec
extracts the path from meta path of heterogeneous network[112]
In our application, we want to leverage the attribute vector of time pattern and text
nodes. We apply a biased meta path method to guide attributed heterogeneous random
walks. Given a attributed heterogeneous network G = (V, E, A) and a meta-path scheme
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P : T1 → T2 → · · · Tt → Tt+1 · · · → Tl , the transition probability at step i is defined as:

p(v i+1 |vti , P) =



sim(fv0 ,fvi+1 )

P


i sim(fv 0 ,fv c )
c ∈N

v
Tt+1 (vt )


1


NTt+1 (vti )





0,

(vti , vi+1 ) ∈ E, ψ(v i+1 ) = Tt+1 , v0 exists
(vti , vi+1 ) ∈ E, ψ(v i+1 ) = Tt+1 , v0 not exists
/E
(v i+1 , vti ) ∈

where vi represents the the node visited in ith step and NTt+1 (vti ) represents the Tt+1 type
neighbor nodes of vi . In our application, we sample paths from symmetric meta path. If vi
in the first half of meta path, the probability of transition to node in type Tt+1 is inversely
proportional to number of neighbors in type Tt+1 . If vi in the second half of meta path,
then a symmetric node of v i+1 exists, which is v 0 in our equation. Here we need to calculate
the similarity of v i+1 and v 0 . sim(fv0 , fvi+1 is the similarity calculated by attribute vector
of node v 0 and node v i+1 A node with higher similarity with v 0 will be sampled with higher
possibility in random walk. With this guide, we can generate node sequences which can be
the input of skip-gram model.
5.3.5 Classification Model
In the end of our model, we feed a pair of account vectors to a binary classifier.
We apply a Deep neural network into account embedding, which contains fully connected
layers. The last layer includes two neurons to decide whether the pair of accounts are from
the same user.

5.4

Experiments and Results
In this section, we first compare the performance of representation learning of auto-

encoders. Followed by the evaluation of User2Vector in Attributed Heterogeneous Information Network.
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Figure (5.6) Filters Learned by the First Layer of 24-7CNN

Figure (5.7) Filters Learned by the Second Layer of 24-7CNN

5.4.1 Time Pattern Embedding Comparisons
In this set of experiments, we first evaluate the effectiveness of CNN encoder as a
representation learning model.
To fully evaluate the representation learning method, we have downloaded the data
from popular Telegram public channels. We develop a related parser to parse the timestamp
list of each account from Jan-3-2022 to Mar-27-2022. Here we parsed 161797 posts from
7569 accounts. If the timestamp list is too short, we are not able to learn the features of a
time pattern. Therefore, we remove accounts that post less than 10 times.
Due to the anonymity of Telegram, we don’t know which ones are owned by the same
user. After we train the encoders with a parsed timestamp list, we randomly separate the
timestamp list of each account into two sublists equally. By comparing the similarities
between those sublists, we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of the learned encoder.
Here we compare four types of encoder and manually-designed features.
Models Here we compare four types of encoder and manually-designed features
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• CNN auto-encoder Details of encoder and decoder design are displayed in Figure 5.3.
In our encoder, we have convolutional layers, max pooling layer and fully connected
layer. Decoder’s designs are opposite layers of related encoder layers.
• RNN auto-encoder RNN auto-encoder’s design is similar to the CNN auto-encoder,
where we replace convolutional layers with simple RNN layers.
• LSTM auto-encoder LSTM auto-encoder’s design is similar to the RNN autoencoder, where we replace simple RNN layers with LSTM layers.
• FC auto-encoder FC represents a fully connected layer. In FC encoder, we have
three layers of fully connected neural networks.
• Manually-designed Features We also test the manually selected features. In our
design, each timestamp list is converted to a 24+7 = 31 dimensional vector. It includes
the number of posts in 24 separate hours and number of posts from Monday to Sunday.
DataSets Here we use 2 types of data
• Telegram Data We parse the timestamp list of each account from Jan-3-2022 to
Mar-27-2022 and randomly separate the timestamp list into two sublists.
• Synthetic For each timestamp list we parse from Telegram, we create a synthetic
timestamp list. We manually replace each timestamp with a random hour in the same
day or same hour on a random day of this week.
Evaluation Metric The aim of our experiments are trying to see whether the learned
embedding can be used to measure the similarities of timestamp lists. Consider the learned
embedding of these models in different scales. Here we use the percentage value as an
evaluation metric instead of Euclidean distance of vectors. We first set a threshold λ%. Here
we calculate the Euclidean distance between learned vectors and link each account with the
top nearest λ% accounts. We use the percentage of successful linkage as Evaluation Metric.
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(a) on real data

(b) on synthetic data

Figure (5.8) Comparisons of Embedding

Figure 5.3 shows the experiment’s result. We start from λ%, which means we link each
account with λ% nearest 1% accounts. We can see embedding learned by CNN encoder can
successfully link 28% of all account pairs, which is much higher than the result from RNN
encoder, LSTM encoder, Fully-Connected encoder and manually designed features.
To get the intuitive sense of embedding of CNN encoder. We convert a vector of 20 pairs
accounts into a 2 dimensional vector. Figure 5.9 shows the result and we can see accounts
from the same user are close to each other.
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(a) on real data

(b) on synthetic data

Figure (5.9) Learned Representation of 24/7 CNN Encoder

5.4.2 User2Vec Performance
To evaluate the performance of our System, we compare three different networks. Not
only the attributed heterogeneous network, we also build heterogeneous network and homogeneous network with the same data.
For the heterogeneous network, we didn’t attach attributes for timestamp nodes or post
type nodes. We use metapath2Vec to sample the path from the network, which will sample
meta paths we extracted from the network schema, however, the possibility of the next node
will not be affected by the attributed vector [112].
For the homogeneous network, we treat all the nodes as the same type and we sample the
paths with DeepWalk which utilizes random walkers without following any meta paths[104].
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We compare the performance of these three models with two community data from
telegram. One is scam related channels and another one is drug related channels.

Table (5.1) Comparisons of Different Models
Channels
Scam
Drug

AHIN+ User2Vec
0.785
0.8025

HIN+ metepath2Vec
0.696
0.713

Homo network+ DeepWalk
0.6875
0.694

Table 5.1 shows the accuracy of trained classifiers of three different models. We can
see that our model which leverages most information from the network can achieve the best
accuracy.
5.4.3 Case Study

Table (5.2) Post Frequency of Account1 and Account2
Account1
date and time
04/16, 9pm
04/16, 10pm
04/16, 11pm
04/17, 12am
04/17, 1am
04/17, 2am

Frequency
9
5
26
12
11
5

Account2
date and time
04/14, 8pm
04/14, 9pm
04/14, 10pm
04/14, 11pm
04/15, 12am
04/15, 1am
04/15, 2am
04/15, 10pm
04/15, 11pm
04/16, 12am
04/16, 1am
04/16, 9pm
04/16, 10pm
04/17, 12am

Frequency
5
10
7
3
2
8
4
1
12
15
6
4
1
5

We also tried unlabeled data from telegram to gain deeper insights of our proposed
model. For the pairs of accounts that are defined as one user, we are with high confidence
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(a) Post of Account1

(b) Post of Account2

Figure (5.10) Post Text of Detected Account Pair Account1 and Account2

that they are the same individual by manually checking. For example, Figure 5.10 shows
the post by these two accounts, we can see the text is extremely similar. Both accounts post
a lot of times. To better show the timestamp list, we count the frequency of posts in each
hour and display the result in Table 5.2. We can tell these two accounts are very active from
10pm to 3am.

5.5

Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of how to identify the accounts from the same

user in Messaging Software. After we parse the chat logs from public channels, we first
extract the features of the timestamp list and text post of each account. We learn the
embedding of timestamp list through a novel 24/7 CNN encoder and the embedding of
post through pre-trained self attention transformer Bert. We further proposed the User2Vec
model, where we sample the meta path from AHIN we build and feed the paths that capture
the structure and semantic relations to the skip-gram model. In the end, we train a binary
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classifier to classify each pair of accounts to decide whether they are the same user or not.
Comprehensive experimental results have demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of
the proposed model.
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PART 6

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, we present our research on how to combat cyber crime by attacking
privacy provided by darknet and IM softwares.
For darknet, we firstly analyze Bitcoin transaction patterns behind cryptomarkets and
discover interesting transaction patterns and management mechanisms from different cryptomarkets. The results demonstrate that the privacy protection mechanism in Bitcoin is still
vulnerable in terms of simple analysis. For markets like the Wall Street market, feedback
reviews released on web pages are highly related with public Bitcoin transactions in terms
of timestamp and money value. An adversary can extract valuable information for analyzing the activities. Based on the transactions pattern we discovered from darknet markets,
we further proposed a method to uncover the Bitcoin addresses of a vendor in darknet by
matching their feedback reviews with public bitcoin transactions. We first proposed the
metric which is maximum coverage of reviews by a Bitcoin address. A Bitcoin address’s
transaction history can match maximum reviews owned by the vendor with the highest possibility. In our model, we construct a K-D tree to efficiently match Bitcoin transactions to
feedback reviews based on timestamp and money value. The problem is proved to be NP
hard. By utilizing the sub modular property of our objective function, we get the address
set with a greedy algorithm that can achieve near-optimal with theoretical guarantee. We
further develop a Cost-Effective Address Searching(CEAS) algorithm that can speed up the
process by pruning the search space effectively. Comprehensive experiments on both real
and synthetic datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our methods.
For IM software like telegram, vendors broadcast their products through related group
chat. A group in such IM softares normally contains thousands of members including both
vendors and customers. Learning infectivity graphs from these group chats can help us ana-
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lyze organizations and supply chains behind these illegal products. We propose an effective
model to discover hidden networks of influence between members in a group chat. We model
message sequences to a multi-dimensional Hawkes process by treating the whole chat history
as sequential events. The triggering pattern between members inside a group can help us
extract influence between different individuals. In our model, we apply NLP techniques to
embed the text information of messages to get a more precise relationship between members
in group chat. We learn the influence graph by applying an expectation–maximization(EM)
algorithm on our text biased multi-dimensional Hawkes Process. And we conduct experiments with designed metrics on synthetic data and real data with different models.
We further study the problem of how to cluster the accounts from the same user in
Messaging Software. We learn the embedding of timestamp list through a novel 24/7 CNN
encoder and the embedding of post through pre-trained self attention transformer Bert. We
further proposed the User2Vec model, where we sample the meta path from AHIN we build
and feed the paths that capture the structure and semantic relations to the skip-gram model.
In the end, we train a binary classifier to classify each pair of accounts to decide whether
they are the same user or not.
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